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ABSTRACT  
 
Prior to 2004 Egyptian law allowed for conferral of nationality by paternal descent only, 
with few exceptions. By barring Egyptian women from passing their nationality to their 
children, such legislation reflected a belief that women were in fact not full members of 
the national political community on an equal footing with men. Facing pressure from 
both internal and external sources, the Egyptian government reformed the law in 2004, 
thereby allowing women to confer their nationality on their children. Yet nearly eight 
years later many children eligible for Egyptian nationality have yet to acquire it, and 
Egyptian women are arguably no closer to being acknowledged as full and active citizens 
of their own country. This reality brings the success of this and other legal reform efforts 
addressing gender inequality into question. 
 
This research project aims to explore the intersections of law, citizenship, gender-based 
discrimination and social reform movements as played out in the case of Egypt’s 2004 
nationality law reform. It is framed within an understanding of citizenship as the active 
participation of the individual in the public life of the community, and advances the 
notion that for women to be considered as citizens on an equal footing with men requires 
that they be afforded the opportunity, space and resources to become active participants. 
It further examines the role of law in social reform movements, questioning whether the 
“success” of reform movements is to be found in the writing of new law itself, in 
improved implementation and enforcement of law, in increased social mobilization, or in 
a combination thereof. Finally, through interviews with Egyptian pro-reform advocates, it 
analyzes the 2004 nationality law reform with a view to understanding the mixed success 
of legal reform movements attempting to combat deep-seated patterns of social 
discrimination, and explores the reformers’ choice of tactics and the impact of these 
choices on the ultimate achievement of their broader goal of gender equality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
While researching broadly on statelessness I came across a brief mention of a group of 
stateless individuals in Egypt about whom I had never before heard mention – the 
children of Egyptian women and foreign men who are for a variety of reasons unable to 
acquire their fathers’ nationality. I found myself wondering: how could this possibly be? 
How could the children of Egyptians, born and raised in Egypt, be considered stateless in 
their own country? As I explored further what unraveled was a complicated story of the 
origins of citizenship as a masculine institution; the importation of Western conceptions 
of citizen and nation to the Middle East and North Africa, where they exist to this day in 
tension with indigenous notions of individual and group identity; and the continuing 
struggle of Egyptian women to be recognized as equal members of their own society. I 
was astonished to discover that many countries throughout the MENA region do not 
recognize women as sources of nationality. That in 2012 there is even a question 
surrounding the right of women to pass their nationality to their children seemed to me a 
stark indication of how far women have yet to go before they will be considered as men’s 
equals.  
Just months later I was sitting in a classroom a few floors above Cairo’s famed 
Tahrir Square when my classmates and I heard a commotion coming from the street 
below. It was the 8
th
 of March 2011, less than a month after the fall of President Hosni 
Mubarak, and a small group of women, inspired by the atmosphere of public protest and 
expression that had helped bring an end to Mubarak’s 30-year regime, had gathered in the 
square to celebrate International Women’s Day. They were there to remind Egypt and the 
world that, having succeeded alongside their male counterparts in what just a month prior 
 2 
would have seemed impossible, they had no intention of simply fading into the 
background by returning quietly to their homes. As they gathered in Tahrir with their 
signs and their chants – a common sight since the start of the uprising on January 25th – a 
group of men gathered and began heckling them. In the end they were literally chased 
from the square to the following refrain: “You are not Egyptians! […] Better for you to 
go home and feed your babies!”1 Over the ensuing weeks I could not shake this scene 
from my head, of the visceral anger stirred up by the image of women banding together 
to claim a space in the public eye for themselves and their demands, and of the denial of 
their Egyptianness for daring to do so. 
Thus it was that I decided to research the 2004 legal reform that granted Egyptian 
women the right to confer nationality. I wanted to better understand the dynamics that 
allowed for women to be recognized as sources of citizenship while simultaneously 
denying them the free public expression that lies at the heart of a citizen’s rights. What I 
discovered caused me to question the efficacy of legislative reform efforts aimed at 
dislodging years of accumulated social and cultural conditioning regarding the place of 
women in society. While I could not help but admire the activists who devoted 
themselves to the campaign to amend Egypt’s nationality law, I came away unconvinced 
by what seemed an incomplete attempt to shift the attitudes of the Egyptian public toward 
gender equality.  
This research project is my attempt to find explanations for these unsettling 
discoveries. It aims to explore the intersections of law, citizenship, gender-based 
                                                        
1 Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Ensure Women Equal Role in Elections, Reform, March 28, 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/28/egypt-ensure-women-equal-role-elections-reform, last visited May 
11, 2012. 
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discrimination and social reform movements as played out in the case of Egypt’s 2004 
nationality law reform. It is framed within an understanding of citizenship as the active 
participation of the individual in the public life of the community, and advances the 
notion that for women to be considered as citizens on an equal footing with men requires 
that they be afforded the opportunity, space and resources to become active participants. 
It further examines the role of law in social reform movements, questioning whether the 
“success” of reform movements is to be found in the writing of new law itself, in 
improved implementation and enforcement of law, in increased social mobilization, or in 
a combination thereof. Finally, through interviews with Egyptian activists, it analyzes the 
nationality law reform with a view to understanding the mixed success of legal reform 
movements attempting to combat deep-seated patterns of social discrimination, and 
explores the reformers’ choice of tactics and the impact of these choices on the ultimate 
achievement of their broader goal of gender equality.  
It is my belief that as Egyptians navigate the period of political, social and 
cultural unrest following the fall of the Mubarak regime, questions regarding the role of 
law in society, Egyptian cultural and political identity, and notions of what it means to be 
a citizen of a “new” Egypt, are of vital importance. This paper is an attempt to grapple 
with these questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
A Brief Overview 
Nationality is internationally accepted as a fundamental human right,
2
 and is enshrined as 
such in a variety of international and regional legal instruments.
3
 Yet women the world 
over routinely face restricted access to nationality rights, including the right to pass their 
nationality to their children. Egypt, like many states both in the MENA region and 
beyond, for years granted nationality almost exclusively on the basis of paternal descent.
4
 
Such practice reflects societal and cultural beliefs about the location of women within the 
state and their position as bearers of rights. That women lacked the ability to pass their 
                                                        
2
 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, NATIONALITY RIGHTS FOR ALL: A PROGRESS REPORT AND GLOBAL SURVEY 
ON STATELESSNESS (2009), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-
report/nationality-rights-all. 
3
 UDHR article 6 states that “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law,” 
while article 15 asserts that “everyone has the right to a nationality” (Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, U.N. GA 217 A (III) (1948)); ICCPR article 16 posits that “everyone shall have the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law,” while article 24(3) provides that “every child 
has the right to acquire a nationality” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 
2200A (XXI), 21, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966)); CRC article 7(1) states that “the child shall 
be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a 
nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents”, while article 
7(2) goes on to say that “Sates Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in 
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless” (Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 
44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)); Article 6(4) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child asserts that “States Parties … shall undertake to ensure that their Constitutional legislation recognizes 
the principles according to which a child shall acquire the nationality of the State in the territory of which 
he has been born if, at the time of the child’s birth, he is not granted nationality by any other State in 
accordance with its laws” (African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990)); Article 7 of the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam refers to state 
obligations to address the issue of statelessness of children born both on a state’s territory or to those 
eligible for its citizenship but residing outside its territory (Covenant on the Rights of the Child in 
Islam, OIC/9-IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.Final (2005)). The Covenant also addresses the right of children of 
unknown descent to a nationality. CEDAW Article 9 requires states to grant women equal rights with men 
to acquire, change or retain nationality, prohibits the automatic change of nationality due to marriage to an 
alien or change of a husband’s nationality, and grants women equal rights with respect to their children’s 
nationality (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 
34/180, 34, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1989)). 
4
 Except in isolated cases where a child was born on Egyptian territory to unknown parents, or to an 
Egyptian mother and a father who was either stateless, unknown, or whose nationality was unknown (Amal 
Abdel Hadi, Engendering the Egyptian Law on Nationality, in AFRICA CITIZENSHIP AND DISCRIMINATION 
AUDIT: THE CASE STUDY OF EGYPT, Open Society Justice Initiative report by the Center for Migration and 
Refugee Studies (The American University in Cairo 2005)). 
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nationality to their children was an indication that they themselves were not viewed as 
full members of their own national community on an equal footing with men.  
The belief that women are not full and equal members of the community is also 
reflected in the stark differences in citizenship participation between men and women. 
Faced with a variety of obstacles - including lack of independent resources, primary 
responsibility for the care of families, relegation to the domestic sphere, and cultural 
assumptions regarding their role and abilities – women are far less likely to engage in the 
activities most closely associated with citizenship. Yet despite these restrictions, women 
do find ways to participate as citizens, albeit often in ways different from men.  
Women’s citizen participation has in part taken the form of involvement in social 
reform movements, which have focused in large part on granting them access to formal 
citizenship rights on par with men. Yet by focusing their efforts on simply reforming the 
law so as to include them, it may be argued that women’s rights activists fail to address 
the broader underlying issues of attitude and behavior that directly affect their 
interactions as members of the community.  
The success or failure of social reform movements rests in part on the strategies 
employed to see them through. Law typically plays a central role in such movements, but 
it behooves anyone with a genuine interest in social change to question whether this pride 
of place is justified. In fact, the role of law in social reform movements has long been a 
topic of debate. Those who view the legal system as being first among the institutions 
that shape social attitudes and behavior are inclined to situate law at the center of any 
effort to effect social change. At the other end of the spectrum we find theorists who view 
law as too complicit in relations of power to faithfully serve as a site of resistance and 
 6 
change.
5
 Between these poles can be found proponents of a mixed approach, viewing law 
as merely one among many tools of resistance, useful in some respects, harmful in others, 
and always to be used strategically in combination with other tactics of social pressure 
and mobilization. 
By engaging in awareness-raising and pressure tactics women’s rights activists 
were able to secure the amendment of Egypt’s nationality law in 2004, allowing Egyptian 
women to pass their nationality to their children regardless of the nationality of the 
fathers. Through the use of a variety of tactics they garnered enough support, both among 
elite decision-makers and within the population at large, to bring change to the law. 
Viewed solely in terms of the passage of progressive legislation, this reform effort can be 
considered a success. Yet while the accomplishment is certainly significant, one must 
question the impact the nationality law reform has had on broader attitudes and behaviors 
relating to gender equality in Egypt.  
This paper uses the example of the 2004 Egyptian nationality law reform to 
explore the role of law in social reform movements. It argues that in emphasizing 
legislative reform over other social change tactics, women’s rights activists succeeded in 
amending the law to reflect greater gender equality but missed the opportunity to affect 
broader cultural change. It begins in Chapter 1 by introducing the concept of citizenship 
as it is conceived of globally and in the Middle East. It presents an argument for viewing 
citizenship as participation, and analyzes how women fit into the participatory paradigm. 
It concludes with a discussion of the reproduction of gender discrimination through 
                                                        
5 Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 L. & SOC. REV. 11 (1995) (referencing 
Marxist critiques of law as a tool for resistance).  
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nationality law. Chapter 2 provides a brief foray into the interaction of women and law in 
the Middle East and North Africa and examines Egypt’s nationality law reform in terms 
of its justifications, the resistance encountered, the substance and effects of the reform 
itself, as well as the barriers to implementation. Chapter 3 explores various tactics used in 
social reform movements, focusing on how change happens, the role of law in social 
change, and the problems inherent in reform imposed from above and imported from 
outside. It concludes with an exploration of the various tactics used by gender equality 
activists in recent years in the MENA region. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of Egypt’s 
2004 nationality law reform through the eyes of the reformers. It uses information 
gleaned from interviews with activists to examine the tactics used to bring about this 
particular legislative reform, as well as to address broader gender equality issues in 
Egypt. The paper ends by arguing that while women’s rights activists secured a 
significant achievement in the 2004 reform, their focus on legislative change represents 
only part of the picture in the struggle for gender equality. 
 
Methodology 
The fieldwork for this project consisted of interviews with seven members of the 
Egyptian women’s rights NGO community. All seven were either personally involved 
with the nationality law campaign or represented organizations that either played a direct 
role in the campaign or are involved more generally in gender equality advocacy in 
Egypt. I used connections within the Cairo NGO community to access initial participants, 
who then assisted me in identifying further participants. This method of participant 
identification and selection necessarily created a sampling bias. That in combination with 
 8 
the small size of the interview sample means that the information collected cannot be 
considered representative of the views of participants in the nationality law reform 
campaign as a whole. This is particularly significant when it comes to discussions of the 
involvement (or lack thereof) of average Egyptian women in the reform effort. 
Considering, however, that those interviewed represented a variety of Egypt’s leading 
women’s rights organizations, most of which were directly involved in the nationality 
law campaign, I am reasonably confident that the views expressed provide an accurate 
glimpse into the minds of the campaign’s chief strategists and actors. 
The participants were asked a set of standard open-ended questions, though were 
also given the freedom to provide their own insights and information outside the 
prescribed questions. All interviews were conducted in English. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING WOMEN AS CITIZENS 
 
DEFINING CITIZENSHIP
6
 
If we are to understand the rights of women as citizens we must first come to an 
understanding of citizenship itself. This is not a simple task, given the myriad ways in 
which the concept has been defined and explored. “Citizenship” denotes membership of a 
community but leaves open to debate how that membership is defined, or even to which 
community it refers. It typically involves a set of rights and obligations, yet defines 
neither their nature nor content. Some define citizenship as a status, others as a practice.
7
  
Most analyses begin by identifying citizenship as the indicator of a relationship 
between the individual and the state. The more legal/political conceptualizations view 
citizenship as a mark of membership in the state,
8
 or a certificate representing legal 
access to state institutions and resources.
9
 The oft-quoted sociologist T.H. Marshall 
described citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community,” and noted that “all who possess the status are equal with respect to the 
rights and duties with which the status is endowed.”10 Such legal-centric formulations 
have been criticized as being excessively narrow, and as focusing on what Ruth Lister 
                                                        
6 Throughout this paper the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ will be used interchangeably. While the 
synonymous nature of the two concepts is by no means an accepted fact, a discussion of their theoretical 
differences falls outside the scope of this paper. 
7 RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, 3 (MacMillen 1997). 
8 Carol Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection, 7 INT J REFUGEE L, 232, 235 
(1995). 
9 URI DAVIS, CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION IN 
ISRAEL, JORDAN, PALESTINE, SYRIA AND LEBANON, xiii & 3 (Ithaca Press 1997). 
10 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1950), reprinted in CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER, 93, 
102 (Gershon Shafir ed., University of Minnesota Press 1998).  
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refers to as ‘formal’ as opposed to ‘substantive’ citizenship.11 In emphasizing access to 
legal citizenship status, and assuming that once included an individual automatically 
enjoys equal access to its associated rights, ‘formal citizenship’ theorists are accused of 
ignoring the realities of political, social and economic power at play. 
What Bryan Turner characterizes as a more sociological take on citizenship 
focuses less on the institution as status, and more as a “set of practices (juridical, 
political, economic & cultural) which define a person as a competent member of 
society.”12 He concerns himself with the social forces producing the practices that shape 
citizenship and the “social arrangements whereby benefits are distributed to different 
sectors of society.”13 Such a focus expands to include not only the relationship between 
state and individual, but also the political relationships between citizens themselves.
14
  
One of the most fundamental philosophical debates in the field of citizenship 
studies revolves around notions of active and passive citizenship. Ancient thinkers 
conceived of the passive citizen as bound by an obligation of obedience to a supreme 
sovereign ruler, and as limited in his personal political autonomy and removed from 
political representation.
15
 By contrast, active citizenship was characterized by the 
participation of individual citizens in decision-making, and envisioned as the activity of 
fulfilling one’s obligations toward one’s fellow citizens.16 The political participation of 
                                                        
11 LISTER, supra note 7. 
12 BRYAN S. TURNER, CITIZENSHIP & SOCIAL THEORY (Sage Publications, 1993), 2. 
13 Id. 
14 LISTER, supra note 7. 
15 David Burchell, Ancient Citizenship and its Inheritors, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, 89, 89 
(Engin P. Isin & Bryan Turner eds., Sage Publications 2003). 
16 Id. 
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the active citizen was viewed as a means to gain respect,
17
 and great value was thus 
placed on public life and public debate, as well as on the “realization of self as a political 
being.”18 Following this train of thought, Mary Dietz presents citizenship as: 
[A] continuous activity and a good in itself, not as a momentary engagement . . . 
with an eye to a final goal or a societal arrangement . . . That activity is a 
demanding process that never ends, for it means engaging in public debate and 
sharing responsibility for self-government.19 
 
Ruth Lister presents us with another dichotomy in the dialogue surrounding 
citizenship, as she juxtaposes what she terms the ‘rights’ and ‘obligation’ approaches.20 
The former rests upon a notion of civil and political rights flowing from membership in 
the community, and serving as a means by which the state “guarantees freedom and 
formal equality of sovereign individual citizens.”21 Here again citizenship is viewed as a 
passive status. By contrast, the obligation approach, similar to the active citizenship 
model, holds the essence of citizenship to be political participation, which is viewed as a 
civic duty and the expression of the citizen’s full potential as a political being.22 Similar 
to Dietz’s description of active citizenship, the obligation model views political activity 
as an end in itself, and associates it with the pursuit of the common good and the self-
development of the individual citizen.
23
  
Ultimately, it is difficult not to take issue with the more legalistic, rights-based 
formulations of citizenship as being too narrowly focused, and too blind to the realities of 
                                                        
17 Mary Dietz, Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship, 116 DAEDALUS: LEARNING ABOUT 
WOMEN: GENDER, POLITICS, AND POWER, 1 (Fall 1987).  
18 RIAN VOET, FEMINISM AND CITIZENSHIP, 10 (Sage Publications, 1998) (describing the civic-republican 
model of citizenship).  
19 Dietz, supra note 17, at 16. 
20 LISTER, supra note 7. 
21 Id. at 13. 
22 Id. at 17.  
23 Id. at 23.  
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power dynamics at play. A grant of citizenship - conceived of as status - and formal 
access to its associated rights, is no guarantee of the ability to exercise those rights. This 
becomes particularly clear in the case of women, who have largely been admitted to the 
ranks of the citizenry in formal terms but who, as we shall see, are by no means able to 
participate in the public life of the community on a par with their male counterparts. 
However one chooses to frame it – as practice, as active citizenship, as obligation - by 
viewing citizenship through the lens of participation, it is transformed into something far 
more dynamic than a mere pronouncement of inclusion in the community, and we are 
better positioned to examine the realities of access to citizenship and its benefits. 
 
Benefits of Citizenship (i.e., Rights) 
Why in the course of these discussions do we so often hear references to an individual’s 
right to nationality? What makes this status such a sought-after commodity? This is 
largely to do with the benefits that flow from the formalization of an individual’s 
relationship to the state. Political liberal constructions of citizenship place the possession 
of rights - typically defined as individual rights, and conceived of as “concrete, specific, 
legal, determined on a state-by-state basis, and claimable in court” - at the heart of 
citizenship.
24
 This is based on a belief in the natural rights of man and the premise that 
“each individual eligible for citizenship is the moral and political equal of every other.”25  
In one of the field’s classic analyses, T.H. Marshall describes citizenship as 
consisting of three categories of rights, beginning with the civil (those rights necessary 
                                                        
24 VOET, supra note 18, at 60-61. 
25 Don Handelman, Contradictions between Citizenship and Nationality: Their Consequences for Ethnicity 
and Inequality in Israel, 7 INT’L. J. POL., CULT. & SOC. 441, 443 (1994). 
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for individual freedom, such as liberty of the person and free speech), followed by the 
political (those rights allowing for participation in the exercise of political power), and 
finally by the social (those rights guaranteeing economic welfare and a share in the social 
heritage of the community).
26
 Marshall views the story of citizenship as being one of 
progress, beginning with the establishment of civil rights in the 18
th
 century, and adding 
successive layers of rights through time.  
A second facet of Marshall’s progress narrative lies in the extension of rights to 
increasing numbers of people, as one by one, previously excluded groups are granted 
membership in the community and access to its resources.
27
 As such, group mobilization 
and political struggle become inextricably linked with citizenship,
28
 as access to rights 
must at times be wrested from states with a vested interest in limiting community 
membership.
29
 Lister, in fact, views social struggle as a central element of the citizenship 
narrative, as “much of the political history of the twentieth century has been characterized 
by battles to extend, defend or give substance to political, civil and social rights of 
citizenship.”30   
 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST/ARAB WORLD 
Citizenship is often presented as a concept unique to the West. According to Engin Isin, 
this is the result of an othering process whereby the dominant citizenship narrative has 
                                                        
26 Marshall, supra note 10. 
27 Id.  
28 VOET, supra note 18. 
29 The state’s interest in limiting access to citizenship may be based on its desire to control its social, 
cultural, or linguistic identity, but also on practical concerns related to the considerable resources necessary 
to ensure the rights associated with citizenship, such as education, health care or welfare benefits. 
30 LISTER, supra note 7, at 4. 
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been built in part on the positioning of the Orient as a frame of reference for 
comparison.
31
 Isin locates Max Weber as the prime proponent of this orientalist 
construction of citizenship.
32
 In Weber’s account, occidental cities arose from the settling 
together of individual strangers who came together by choice and swore an oath of 
citizenship subjecting themselves to a law exclusively applicable to them, which they had 
an active role in creating. Perhaps most importantly, the ancient occidental city allowed 
for the formation of groups based on bonds other than lineage, kinship or religion.
33
 By 
contrast, oriental cities never allowed for the dissolving of tribal bonds or identities, thus 
preventing the establishment of a legal status of urban citizenship or the possibility of 
common action along anything but clan and kinship lines.
34
 
Whether or not we accept Weber’s hypothesis, it is fair to say that concepts of 
citizenship, wherever they have their origin, have taken on a different flavor in the Arab 
world than in the West. According to Gianluca Parolin, this is due to the divergent paths 
taken by the Latin/Western and Arab/Eastern worlds from their similar foundation in 
Greek philosophy.
35
 While the West located the heart of political authority in 
sovereignty, fostered the figure of the individual as paramount, and developed the notion 
of natural rights (as derived from natural law) and membership in the political 
community as a means of ensuring those rights, the East founded its political authority in 
uncontested rules based on religious legitimacy, combined civil and religious authority in 
                                                        
31 ENGIN F. ISIN, BEING POLITICAL: GENEAOLOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP (University of Minnesota Press 2002).  
32 Engin F. Isin, Citizenship After Orientalism, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, supra note 15. 
33 Max Weber, Citizenship in Ancient and Medieval Cities (1981), reprinted in CITIZENSHIP DEBATES, 
supra note 10. 
34 Id. Weber postulates that Islam played a role in this, with its emphasis on clan and kinship, though as will 
be discussed later, it is unclear that Islam in fact encouraged clan associations above all others. 
35 GIANLUCA P. PAROLIN, CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD: KIN, RELIGION AND NATION-STATE 
(Amsterdan University Press 2009). 
 15 
the role of the caliph, maintained much of its traditional kin-based social structure 
(characterized as automatic, perpetual and exclusive), and defined its interpersonal 
relationships in terms of group rather than individual relations.
36
 
Parolin analyzes Arab notions of belonging according to three forms of group 
membership: that of the kin group, religious community, and nation-state. Membership in 
the kin group is identified as the first form of group membership in pre-Islam Arabia, and 
is traced through a single line of patrilineal descent.
37
 As kinship formed the basis of the 
main societal bond, genealogical lines were safely guarded, and individuals could only 
gain full membership if both of their parents were Arab members of the same kin group. 
It was through membership in the kin group that protection was afforded, and there 
existed no concept of individual rights.
38
 With the arrival of the Prophet Mohamed came 
the formation of a religious community and the creation of a centralized political power 
in the Arabian peninsula.
39
 The goal of Islam was to “obliterate every trace of the 
ancestral system of the previous era” to form a brotherhood of believers, but traces of the 
kin group system stubbornly remained.
40
 An individual became a member of the 
community either through birth or conversion. Every child born to a Muslim man was 
automatically a Muslim, and a Muslim could only generate other Muslims as a Muslim 
woman was obliged to marry a Muslim man.
41
 Islamic law took precedence over other 
forms of law, religious or otherwise, and applied to all Muslims wherever they were.
42
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Parolin’s third and final form of group membership was born with the first Ottoman 
Nationality Law (of 1869), which was intended to clearly establish whom the Ottoman 
state had jurisdiction over, and was framed according to political, rather than religious, 
authority. One of its goals was the equalization of all Ottoman subjects, regardless of 
ethnic or religious affiliation. It has been characterized as the legal origin of citizenship in 
the Middle East,
43
 and represented a broadly-based importation of Western models of 
citizenship, law and application of law. 
While this law may have introduced Western notions of citizenship into the law of 
the emerging Middle Eastern nation-state, it cannot be said that a Western philosophy of 
citizenship was adopted wholesale. This is particularly evident when it comes to the 
concept of rights, whether perceived as an individual’s right to a nationality in the first 
place or the implied provision of rights as a consequence of nationality. Uri Davis notes 
that the tendency of states born out of the fall of the Ottoman Empire was to regard 
citizenship “not as a certificate representing the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state, 
but as a certificate of loyalty to the imagined community of the nation.”44 Furthermore, it 
was conceived of as a privilege granted by the head of state, and not as a fundamental 
right.
45
 It is important to understand this underlying attitude toward rights when 
analyzing the position of marginalized groups in the Middle East. For arguments 
advocating for increased access to citizenship and its benefits may encounter significant 
barriers within such a context when framed in the language of rights.  
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45 Abbas Shiblak, The Lost Tribes of Arabia, 32 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 37 (2009).  
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If the first Ottoman Nationality Law was born of a desire to consolidate civil 
power and define the jurisdiction of the empire, post-Ottoman laws regulating 
membership in the political community can be interpreted as assertions of sovereignty on 
the part of newly emerging nation-states.
46
 Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention states 
that, ”it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals.”47 This 
determination plays a role in defining the state’s self-identification,48 as the state, through 
the vehicle of citizenship, constructs the “legal and ideological parameters of inclusion 
and exclusion.”49 While some states construct their visions of inclusion around 
reinforcing territorial communities, others attach to it more highly charged “sentiments of 
membership based on exclusive notions of race, descent or other qualifying factors.”50  
Though similarities may certainly be found throughout the Middle East, each state 
has taken a particular route to defining national identity and “the citizen” depending upon 
its own challenges. While Iraq under the Ba’ath was controlled by a minority ruling elite 
which courted the loyalty of the population away from family and ethnic groups and 
toward the state, Lebanon’s uniquely heterogeneous and factionalized ruling elite 
“bolstered primordial affiliations at the expense of national loyalties.”51 In Egypt’s early 
days as a nation-state, focus was placed on the sharing of linguistic and religious ties, 
                                                        
46 PAROLIN, supra note 35. 
47 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, League of Nations, 
179 L.N.T.S. 89 (12 April 1930). The article goes on to state that, “This law shall be recognized by other 
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48 U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, Women, Nationality and Citizenship, WOMEN: 2000 AND 
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49 LISTER, supra note 7, at 51. 
50 Batchelor, supra note 8, at 238. 
51 Margot Badran, Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-
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with nationality reserved for those considered most easily assimilable along ethnic and 
religious lines.
52
 Parolin highlights the use of nationality as a political tool for 
manipulating demographics, presenting as examples Bahrain, where the grant of 
nationality has been used to counterbalance the demographic majority of Shias, and post-
Ottoman Iraq, where a perceived need to increase the population led to a generous 
opening of nationality to any Ottoman subject, regardless of ethnic origin.
53
 
Whatever influences they may have absorbed and whatever attitudes they may 
have adopted through the years, the majority of states in the Middle East have come to 
embrace what Shiblak perceives to be “a narrow concept of citizenship and restrictive 
nationality laws.”54 Paramount throughout the region has been the principle of jus 
sanguinis, or nationality by descent, whereby citizenship is passed to children at birth 
simply by virtue of their having been born to a citizen.
55
 This may be juxtaposed against 
the principle of jus soli, whereby nationality is granted to an individual by virtue of birth 
within the national territory. If one were to look at this through a Weberian lens, it would 
be easy to draw a link between his notions of occidental territoriality and the principle of 
jus soli (currently practiced more commonly in Western countries) versus the oriental 
focus on family and kin and the principle of jus sanguinis.  
Further to the more restrictive practice of jus sanguinis is the tendency among 
Middle Eastern states to grant nationality largely on the basis of paternal jus sanguinis. 
With few exceptions, states in the region grant nationality automatically only to the 
children of male citizens. Exceptions may be made for children born to female citizens 
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when the identity of the father is unknown, his nationality is unknown, or he is stateless, 
and also to children born within the national territory to unknown parents. The practice of 
paternal jus sanguinis falls very much in line with what may be viewed as a progression 
from the patrilineal determination of group membership predominant in the kin groups of 
pre-Islam Arabia, to the admittance of any child born to a Muslim father into the 
brotherhood of Muslim believers, and finally to the automatic conferral of citizenship on 
the children of any male citizen of the nation-state.  
 
WOMEN AS EQUAL CITIZENS & FULL MEMBERS OF SOCIETY 
Having outlined basic conceptualizations of citizenship, both globally and regionally, we 
now turn our attention to the notion of women as citizens. Dominant liberal formulations 
of citizenship pose it as a gender-neutral institution. In theory, all citizens have equal 
rights under the law and any inequality between them must be due rather to injustice than 
to citizenship itself.
56
 Yet many theorists argue that citizenship is in fact “deeply 
gendered”57 insofar as conceptualizations of citizenship are derived from a set of values 
that explicitly and implicitly privileges men and the masculine.
58
 The reality of women’s 
secondary status suggests that for them full and equal citizenship does not exist,
59
 since 
                                                        
56 VOET, supra note 18; see also Maurice Roche, Citizenship, Social Theory and Social Change, 16 
THEORY & SOCIETY 363 (1987), noting that the equal status, rights and duties implied by liberal 
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57 Suad Joseph, Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East, in GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST, 3 (Suad Joseph ed., Syracuse University Press 2000); see also LISTER, supra note 7. 
58 Kathleen B. Jones, Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity, 15 SIGNS 781, 781 (Summer 1990). 
59 VOET, supra note 18. 
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even in contexts where women have gained legal equality their membership in the 
political community is still less full than men’s.60  
Women have traditionally been excluded from the legal status of citizenship in 
part because (public) political values were explicitly tied to maleness, and women were 
viewed as being inherently apolitical/antipolitical beings belonging to the private 
sphere.
61
 Such arguments exhibit what Lister calls an “essentialist categorization of men 
and women’s qualities and capacities,” and rest on false dichotomies associating the 
public/male/citizen with the disembodied mind, the abstract, rational, impartial, 
independent, active and strong, and the private/female/non-citizen with the particular, 
embodied, emotional, irrational, dependent, passive and weak, rooted in nature and 
concerned with the realm of domestic concerns rather than the good of the community as 
a whole.
62
 In some formulations women’s exclusion results from a perception that they 
are incapable of autonomous thought or action, and thus require the mediation of others 
on their behalf.
63
 Accordingly, women’s citizenship has often been perceived of as 
superfluous, as their interests were thought to be represented by their male relatives, 
whether father, husband or other. 
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Women’s exclusion has manifested itself in more than strictly formal political 
terms, but also in the social and economic spheres. And in fact, their exclusion from the 
former is inextricably tied to their marginalization and dependence in the latter. Lister 
notes that the independence and autonomy that men possess - and that permits them to act 
publicly as citizens - is “predicated on women’s dependence,” an economic dependence 
born of the responsibility women take for the care of families, which simultaneously frees 
men and prohibits women from pursuing the activities that have come to define 
citizenship.
64
  
 
Women’s Citizenship Participation 
Part of the confusion surrounding the role of women as citizens lies in the sheer number 
and variety of visions for women’s citizenship. The classic liberal argument put forth 
during the late 18
th
 century suffrage era framed women’s citizenship in the language of 
equality. If natural rights were held to be the basis for (male) citizenship rights, then to 
not extend those same rights to women could only be justified if women were considered 
to not have the same natural rights as men.
65
 This belief is echoed in Mary Dietz’s 
argument that women should simply be included as citizens along the same lines as men, 
with access to the same rights, privileges, responsibilities, spaces and role in decision-
making.
66
 Yet this has proven difficult to accomplish. Early notions of citizenship were 
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constructed around the citizen as soldier and defender of the nation. This correlation 
between military service and citizenship translated into a set of superior social citizenship 
rights for men and the exclusion of women, who were not admitted into the ranks of the 
military.
67
 Paid employment has since replaced military service as the key to 
citizenship,
68
 with the full citizen being perceived as one who is financially independent 
and contributes to the sustaining of the nation through his labor and income. Yet despite 
women’s growing presence in the labor force, they are largely considered as secondary or 
marginal earners, with men firmly ensconced in the head of household/breadwinner role 
most closely associated with full citizenship.
69
  
As a means to maneuver around these obstacles some feminists have advocated 
for the acknowledgment of motherhood and other forms of caring work traditionally 
performed by women in the private sphere (and without pay) as the “ethical equivalent of 
military service” and a basis for a “feminine citizenship” which would put them on an 
equal footing with men.
70
 Rousseauian conceptions place women in the role of 
“republican mothers” by assigning to them the task of educating their sons in the virtues 
of citizenship, thus reducing them to producers of citizens, rather than citizens in their 
own right. More generous formulations of women’s citizenship view gender difference as 
a means to the betterment of society and politics, and call for political equality in rights, 
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but expressed through different duties and activities for men and women, the combination 
of which serves to strengthen the state.
71
  
It seems that despite these various visions we have not progressed much beyond 
simple inclusion of women into formal citizenship status as defined by the male citizen 
model. And while few would deny that women have made great strides in gaining 
admission to this status and access to many of the formal rights associated with it, as 
Voet notes, rights (formal citizenship) are only a precondition for active (substantive) 
citizenship, and it is “at the level of participation that we see the major distinctions 
between male citizens and female citizens, not at the level of rights.”72 The current 
struggle for women centers more around their exclusion from citizenship participation 
and their socialization as non-political beings.
73
  
 
Barriers to women’s participation  
So what is it exactly that stands between women and the exercise of citizenship activity? 
The barriers are many and varied, and take both material and psychological form. To 
begin with, women suffer disproportionately from poverty.
74
 Women’s economic 
dependence on men and lack of access to the labor force, as well as the unequal 
distribution of income within the family translate into less flexibility for women, and a 
diminished voice within the family and control over their own activities.  
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Time is another resource with profound implications on an individual’s ability to 
act as a citizen in the public sphere, and to pursue the self-development critical to the 
effective exercise of citizenship.
75
 Tasked with the responsibility of caring for families 
(and in modern times this is often combined with women’s paid labor outside the home), 
women rarely have the luxury of time with which to pursue citizenship activities. 
Moreover, women’s relegation to the private sphere limits their physical mobility and 
translates into diminished access to the means of economic and political participation.  
Lying at the heart of women’s lack of access to public citizenship activity is the 
sexual division of domestic labor, which Lister believes “moulds female and male access 
routes to the public sphere.”76 She notes that even in those cases where public childcare 
has been made available to help free women up for increased public participation, the 
division of the remaining domestic labor falls more heavily on women. Without 
addressing this disparity, it will not be possible for women to enjoy full and equal access 
to citizenship activity.  
Further to the material restraints on women’s public activity are the psychological 
barriers that keep them from citizenship participation. Socialized to accept a subservient 
role both within and outside the family, women often lack both the skills and the self-
esteem to successfully act in the political arena. The economic dependence resulting from 
traditional family configurations creates an emotional dependence and a lack of 
confidence in women’s own separate identity and abilities, which is a necessary element 
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in effective citizenship participation.
77
 Excluded from decision-making within the family, 
given the chance women find themselves unprepared to participate in decision-making in 
the public sphere.  
All of which is to say that if we conceive of active, public political participation 
as lying at the heart of citizenship, women, who are typically lacking in the time and 
resources necessary for such participation, find themselves at a distinct disadvantage, 
leaving them largely excluded. 
 
The various forms of women’s participation 
For all the reasons just discussed women undeniably have significantly lower rates of 
participation in the sphere of formal politics and decision-making than men. However 
this does not translate into a complete lack of female presence in public life. Due to 
constraints on time and other resources, women are far more likely to engage in what has 
been referred to as ‘informal politics.’78 This often takes the form of involvement in 
community-based action on the local political stage, behind which women are often a 
driving force. And it is primarily as mothers that women first cross the public-private 
divide to enter the political arena, for it is as mothers, and not as women, that they often 
feel most “justified in taking over public political space.”79 Thus women translate their 
private responsibilities into public citizenship claims, and motherhood becomes a vehicle 
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for political citizenship as women struggle to protect their families.
80
 A second arena in 
which women’s presence has loomed large is in the struggle for social citizenship rights, 
at what Lister terms the “intersection of social and political citizenship.”81 She posits 
women’s interaction with social welfare institutions as a primary manifestation of their 
political activity, as they contest individual agency decisions and organize to affect a 
change in policies that affect a broad base of welfare claimants.
82
 
Whatever their motivation, it is clear that involvement in small-scale, informal 
political action serves a purpose for women. It may be seen as a means by which women 
strengthen their self-esteem and gain the political competence necessary for sustained and 
active citizenship, and by which they come to identify themselves as political beings.
83
 
Yet this informal mode of political participation is not often recognized as citizenship 
action.
84
 Lister contends that “the invisibility of women’s political activism is in part a 
reflection of the tendency to define politics within the narrow terms of the masculine 
sphere of formal politics,” and argues for the recognition of women’s informal political 
participation as simply a different form of political citizenship.
85
 She notes that while 
such recognition would go a long way in promoting the inclusion of women into the 
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ranks of the citizenry, in order to achieve true equality it must also be balanced with 
women’s admission into more formal modes of political participation, as well as the 
improvement of links between the two realms of political action. 
All the news is not bad when it comes to women’s participation in the public 
sphere. Aili Mari Tripp has observed an exponential increase since the early 1990s in the 
arenas in which women are able to voice their concerns and in the forms of mobilization 
women have adopted.
86
 She notes that previously much of women’s activity on the 
national level had been linked with single political parties or regimes in response to calls 
for the establishment of institutional mechanisms to promote women’s advancement and 
institute international agreements.
87
 Even without the existence of international pressure, 
official women’s organizations have often been established and controlled by political 
parties and regimes as a means to promote limited reform while also channeling women’s 
political activity in pre-approved ways. Yet Tripp notes a shift in the form and 
characteristics of women’s mobilization, including an increased autonomy from the 
party/regime model; an increased heterogeneity of small organizations focused on 
different facets of women’s advancement coming together to address specific issues; 
greater emphasis on formal political strategies and the selective use of courts; growing 
challenges to government gender policies and laws (including constitutions); the 
aggressive use of the media to highlight the demand for rights; and an explicit effort to 
bridge traditional gaps between women and within women’s organizations based on 
                                                        
86 Aili Mari Tripp, Women in Movement: Transformations in African Political Landscapes, in THE 
POLITICAL INTERESTS OF GENDER REVISITED: REDOING THEORY AND RESEARCH WITH A FEMINIST FACE, 
230 (Anna G. Jonasdottir & Kathleen B. Jones eds., United Nations Press 2009). 
87 This happened particularly in response to calls made at the UN Women’s Conferences in Mexico City in 
1975 and Beijing in 1995. 
 28 
educational, ethnic and other backgrounds.
88
 Kathleen Jones highlights women’s use of 
direct action as an informal method of public participation. Through activities such as 
Take Back the Night events, where women gather en masse to assert their right to inhabit 
public spaces free from the fear of violent attack or harassment, they are speaking and 
being heard publicly, but in a voice outside the norm of citizenship activity.
89
 
 
Reproduction of Discrimination Through Nationality Law 
Given that women have historically not been viewed as full and equal members of the 
political community, it is unsurprising that they would be discriminated against under the 
law, and particularly the area of law that regulates the acquisition and conferral of 
citizenship. Women have largely been subsumed into the political personalities of their 
male relatives and restricted from passing what in practice amounts to partial citizenship 
to their family members, whether husbands or children.  
Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) defines discrimination against women as: 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.90 
 
Core CEDAW obligations include: the elimination of gender discrimination, both direct 
and indirect, in law; protection against discrimination in public and private, whether at 
the hands of public authorities, the judiciary, organizations, enterprises or private 
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individuals; and the improvement of the de facto position of women through the 
implementation of concrete and effective policies.
91
 Article 9(1) of the Convention grants 
women equal rights with men in regard to the acquisition, change or retention of 
nationality. Article 9(2) further grants women equal rights with men in regard to the 
nationality of their children. It must be noted that several countries, Egypt included, have 
placed reservations on CEDAW Article 9, based on perceived conflicts with either 
shari’a law, domestic nationality law, the unity of the family principle, or objections to 
dual nationality, all of which take precedence over aspirations toward gender equality.
92
 
Gender discrimination in nationality law must be viewed as “part and parcel of an 
overall socio-cultural tendency to de-prioritize women’s needs and rights.”93 The need for 
reform in this specific regard was acknowledged as a concern as early as 1933, which 
saw the drafting of the Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Women by the 
Inter-American Commission on Women.
94
 The Montevideo Convention asserted that 
there should be no distinction based on sex as relates to nationality, whether in legislation 
or in practice. Nearly a quarter century later (1957) the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women was drafted as a means to establish the independent nationality of 
married women. Neither instrument garnered many signatories, effectively nullifying 
their impact on both international and domestic law and practice. 
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Nationality law is a complex arena with consequences that are both far-reaching 
and tangibly felt. The UN Division for the Advancement of Women notes that: 
Nationality laws are rarely simple or comprehensive, and their technical 
nature makes them inaccessible to many people. Moreover, movements of 
peoples across international borders frequently make the laws of more than 
one State applicable in the determination of a person’s nationality. 
Inconsistency between, and lack of coordination of, nationality laws between 
and among States means that nationality may be uncertain or contested, 
causing hardship to the individuals concerned.95 
 
These hardships are many and varied, and in the more extreme cases may result in an 
individual being rendered stateless. Furthermore, they are disproportionately felt by 
women. Informal statistics reported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees indicate 
that in those countries operating discriminatory nationality laws, women in fact make up 
51-78% of the stateless population.
96
  
 
Marriage & Citizenship 
As has been previously mentioned, through the years and across continents women have 
been excluded from acquiring a legal personality of their own. Rather, through the 
practice of dependent nationality, a woman’s legal status has historically been acquired 
through her relationship to a man, whether father or husband, who in theory represents 
her interests in the public arena.
97
 Upon marriage, this takes shape in the principle of 
coverature, by which married women are “subsumed into the legal personalities of their 
husbands.”98 The husband, as head of household, enjoys the status of civil citizenship, 
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while the wife lives under his ‘cover.’ Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon view this 
subsuming of women as a constitutive characteristic of modern civil citizenship insofar as 
marriage was the act that shed men of their own dependence on their families, and 
transformed them into family heads and legal individuals in their own right. Early civil 
rights were not conceived of as individual rights, but rather as the rights of male family 
heads acting on behalf of their families.
99
 Having dependents (including wives) became a 
qualification for full civil citizenship. Fraser and Gordon thus note that “it was by 
protecting, subsuming, and even owning others that white male property owners and 
family heads became citizens.”100 The principle of coverature formed the basis of a sort 
of ‘indirect citizenship’, which deprived women of a voice of their own, both within and 
outside the family.
101
  
While the decisions to marry and reproduce are ostensibly private ones, their 
effect on the composition of the citizenry make them of interest to the state.
102
 This is 
particularly the case in relation to foreign spouses, but may also be observed within 
national populations themselves. Suad Joseph notes that in Lebanon, where the balance of 
political power rests on a complex system of confessional representation, women and the 
                                                        
99 CRTD’s study notes that this configuration is still prevalent in the MENA region, where the assumption 
that all members of a family should have the same nationality is based on notions of the family as a single 
unit, represented by the male head of household (CRTD, supra note 93). 
100 Fraser & Gordon, supra note 98, at 120; similarly, Ursula Vogel notes that women weren’t merely 
latecomers in Marshall’s evolution of access to citizenship rights, but rather their exclusion from early 
forms of citizenship was part and parcel of the construction of the entitlement of men as both individuals 
and representatives of families (Ursula Vogel, Is citizenship gender specific?, in THE FRONTIERS OF 
CITIZENSHIP (Ursula Vogel & M. Moran, eds., MacMillan 1991)). 
101 Nira Yuval-Davis notes that law in Victorian England went so far as to deprive women of citizenship 
upon marriage to any man, whether English or not. It was only in 1948 that this restriction was amended to 
apply only in cases of marriage to foreign men (Nira Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship and Difference, 57 
FEMINIST REV. 4, 12 (1997)). 
102 Sandra Fernandez, Pluralities (2011) [unpublished Master’s thesis, The American University in Cairo].  
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family are vital to the reproduction of sectarianism.
103
 If women marry out of their 
sectarian group, lineages lose membership and thus representational power. Women’s 
marriage and reproductive choices thereby become of interest to the state and subject to 
its control, and women who marry out of the group cease to belong to it.
104
 
Within the context of transnational marriage we find these ideas taking shape in 
the form of the unity of nationality principle.
105
 This springs from the assumption that 
all members of a family should carry the same nationality as a means to reduce the 
potential division of loyalties.
106
 Moreover, there exists an assumption that the woman 
will be the ones to move to her husband’s state rather than other way around. This rests in 
part on the belief that the introduction of foreign men is potentially disruptive to the state, 
since they take jobs from local men and dilute national identity and subvert national 
interests by their very presence in public life.
107
 For that reason, restrictions on foreign 
husbands tend to be much harsher than those on foreign wives. The consequences for 
women married to foreign men can be severe. The dominance of patriarchal principles 
has meant that, unsurprisingly, women are the ones to give up their citizenship upon 
marriage to acquire that of their husbands.
108
 In the most extreme cases this shifting of 
                                                        
103 Joseph, Elite Strategies for State Building: Women, Family, Religion and State in Iraq and Lebanon 
[hereinafter Elite Strategies], in WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE STATE, supra note 51, at 189. 
104 The exclusion of women who ‘marry out’ is mirrored in Muslim religious practice, wherein a Muslim 
women is forbidden to marry a non-Muslim man. In terms of nationality law, women are not conceived of 
as individuals but rather as family members whose rights and duties are defined in relation to their 
kinsmen, and as such if they choose to marry out they may be henceforth excluded from the kin group or 
nation-state (as in Kuwaiti women married to non-Kuwaitis, who as a result of their choice of marriage 
partner, cease to be Kuwaiti (Haya Al-Mughni & Mary Ann Tetreault, Citizenship, Gender, and the Politics 
of Quasi States, in GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 57)).  
105 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, supra note 48. 
106 Which again rests on the assumption that nationality entails loyalty to the state in exchange for the 
state’s duty to protect (CRTD, supra note 93). 
107 U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, supra note 48; CRTD, supra note 93. 
108 Abla Amawi notes that the Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954 went so far as to state that “the wife of 
the Jordanian is a Jordanian and the wife of a foreigner is a foreigner.” This language was amended in 
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nationality occurs automatically, and if the woman’s state revokes her citizenship upon 
marriage but her husband’s doesn’t automatically grant its citizenship, she may find 
herself stateless.
109
  
 
Conferral of Nationality on Children 
The majority of states that provide for nationality by descent (both in the Middle East and 
throughout the world) do so according to the nationality of the father, irrespective of the 
nationality of his spouse.
110
 Exceptions are typically only made in cases where the mother 
is unmarried or the father is unknown or stateless, though this may be difficult to prove 
and is by no means guaranteed. In reality, children may easily be born without a 
nationality if the father is stateless or unknown, if his country does not allow for 
transmission of nationality to children born outside its territory, if he is unwilling or 
unable to register his children at a consulate, or if he refuses to acknowledge paternity.
111
 
In some countries a woman having a child out of wedlock is prevented from passing on 
her nationality, also potentially rendering the child stateless.  
Joseph asserts that “the tensions between passing citizenship on through land 
versus blood are critical to the gendering of citizenship,” noting that “the privileging of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1987, though Jordanian women are still barred from passing nationality to their husbands (Abla Amawi, 
Gender and Citizenship in Jordan, in GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 57, at 
161).  
109 UNHCR, supra note 92; the UNHCR has recognized that statelessness may arise as a result of “denial of 
a woman’s ability to pass on nationality […] loss of nationality due to a person’s marriage to an alien or 
due to a change of nationality of a spouse during marriage.” (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless 
Persons, No. 106 (LVII) (6 October 2006). 
110 U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, supra note 48. 
111 UNHCR, supra note 92. Within the Egyptian context this occurs not infrequently in what some have 
termed ‘summer marriages,’ wherein wealthy men from the Gulf states holiday in Egypt and take 
temporary wives, whom they then leave behind (often with children) when they return to their home 
countries. 
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blood in citizenship rules has gone hand in hand with the masculinization of descent and 
the hyper-valorization of patrilineality.”112 Thus in the form of citizenship laws based on 
paternal jus sanguinis we see yet another validation of men as the locus of citizenship and 
women as secondary at best, external at worst. By refusing women the right to serve on 
equal ground as sources of citizenship, states demonstrate a belief that they do not in fact 
occupy the same citizenship status as men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
112 Joseph, Gendering Citizenship, supra note 57, at 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WOMEN & LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA 
Despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, women in the Middle East and North 
Africa face a great deal of discrimination, both in law and in practice. A 2004 Freedom 
House survey of 17 MENA countries came to the conclusion that it was in this region that 
“the gap between the rights of men and those of women is the most visible and significant 
and where resistance to women’s equality has been most challenging.”113 The study 
found that though most of the countries surveyed had equal rights guarantees written into 
their constitutions, enforcement of these guarantees was severely lacking. The areas of 
greatest concern were found to be: the codification of inferior status due to legal 
discrimination,
114
 particularly within family and citizenship law; the prevalence of and 
lack of legal protection against domestic violence;
115
 the lack of information and 
education for women, resulting in an absence of voice; and a lack of complaint 
mechanisms by which women may attempt to have their grievances aired and 
addressed.
116
 These factors, in combination with long-standing social customs that render 
behavior change and enforcement particularly challenging, have led to the entrenchment 
                                                        
113 FREEDOM HOUSE, WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: CITIZENSHIP AND 
JUSTICE, 1 (Sameena Nazir & Leigh Tomppert eds., 2005). 
114 For example, the survey found that in most MENA countries women were subject to harsher penalties 
than were men charged with the same crime, particularly in relation to ‘moral crimes’ involving sexual 
behavior (and perceived of as negatively impacting family honor).  
115 The survey found the MENA region to be unique in its array of laws, practices and customs that “pose 
major obstacles to the protection of women or the punishment of abusers … intensified by a legal structure 
that places the burden of proof entirely on the female victim in cases of gender based violence, something 
that discourages women from reporting acts of violence or demanding legal redress.” Furthermore, a 
woman’s testimony is typically treated as less than a man’s in cases relating to rape or domestic violence 
(Id. at 6-7). 
116 Lack of access to the legal system in combination with the social pressure to obey one’s husband were 
found to be serious obstacles keeping women from seeking legal redress. At the time of the study, Egypt 
was the only one of the seventeen countries surveyed that offered an official mechanism whereby women 
might file complaints relating to gender discrimination. 
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of a system in which women enjoy neither equal rights as citizens nor an independent 
legal identity.
117
 
 
Women & Citizenship in Islam 
If we are to examine women’s citizenship and law in the Middle East we must address 
the place of women as members of the community of Islam. The Qur’an acknowledges 
women as political actors with the individual ability to pledge allegiance to the Prophet 
(and thereby to the community of believers, or ummah).
118
 Many scholars and advocates 
for women’s rights within a Muslim context are quick to point out that women were 
bearers of rights as members of early Muslim communities on a level quite comparable to 
men. They had the right to independent legal and economic identity, payment for work, 
ownership and inheritance of property, learning and liberty of thought and movement, 
performance of the pilgrimage and participation in Holy War, and control over their own 
lives through marriage contracts stipulating the right to initiate divorce, financial 
compensation, monogamy and child custody.
119
 By all accounts these look much like 
modern-day expressions of human and citizenship rights. Yet it must be noted that 
“Quranic laws on women as political actors provide principles of women’s welfare within 
                                                        
117 Id.  
118 Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Women and Citizenship in the Qur’an, in WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND 
DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, 23, 29-30 (Amira El Azhary Sonbol ed., Syracuse University Press 
1996).  
119 Mervat Tallawy, International Organizations, National Machinery, Islam, and Foreign Policy, in 
MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION: IMPLEMENTING THE BEIJING PLATFORM, 128, 137 
(Mahnaz Afkhami & Erika Friedl eds., Syracuse University Press 1997).  
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the context of communal welfare.”120 Women (similar to men) are not granted rights on 
an individual basis, but rather on the basis of their membership in the community.  
We must also acknowledge that in Islam there exist concepts that limit a woman’s 
ability to act as an independent and equal member of the community. The first is the 
concept of complementarity, which posits that men and women were endowed by God 
with different, yet equally important and complementary, roles based on their natural 
dispositions.
121
 Men’s natural disposition secures them a place in the public sphere of 
citizenship participation and political decision-making, while women’s destines them for 
a life of caring responsibilities within the context of the home and family. The second 
concept can be perceived of as stemming from the first, and involves the exercise of male 
guardianship over women, who are exhorted to trade the protection (whether physical or 
economic) of their husbands for obedience to his word. As such we may observe a 
gender-based determination of the rights and responsibilities of citizens in the ummah,
122
 
which, perhaps not surprisingly, have expanded to involve male social and political 
preeminence.  
 
Personal Status Law 
Stemming from the preeminence of Islamic over civil law within the ummah is a further 
characteristic that makes Middle Eastern countries unique in the world: the presence of 
                                                        
120 Stowasser, supra note 118, at 38. 
121 Afsaneh Najmabadi, Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in Contemporary 
Iran, in WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE STATE, supra note 51 (noting that Islamist opposition to women’s rights 
is often based on arguments that complementarity of roles is divinely ordained, and thus equality between 
the sexes is an injustice).  
122 Fati Ziai, Personal Status Codes and Women’s Rights in the Maghreb, in MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE 
POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION, supra note 119. 
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personal status laws, or family codes. These are sets of laws governed by religious law 
principles, and pertaining specifically to aspects of family relationships including 
marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance. Essam Fawzy notes that personal status 
law is the lone jurisdiction to have successfully resisted repeated attempts at 
secularization as other legal arenas have been absorbed into a civil law framework.
123
 He 
notes also that governments have proven cautious in amending personal status laws, for 
fear of provoking resistance based on prevailing religious, male hierarchical and 
ideological movements. The result has been a sort of hybrid legal system, whereby the 
state asserts influence over women’s public role while religious institutions retain control 
over their private and family lives.
124
 Joseph argues that the anchoring of family law in 
religious law, perceived of as absolute and nonnegotiable, has resulted in the 
sanctification of the family and the codification of its patriarchal rules, with impact well 
beyond the realm of the family.
125
 
In a practical sense, what this means for women is that those aspects of the legal 
system that have arguably the most intimate and powerful impact on their lives are 
governed by Islamic law principles that clearly place men in the position of head of 
household and chief decision maker. This has the effect of granting men social, and in 
some cases, legal authority over their wives,
126
 particularly in a context where the family 
                                                        
123 Essam Fawzy, Muslim Personal Status Law in Egypt: The Current Situation and Possibilities of Reform 
through Internal Initiatives, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM, 15 
(Lynn Welchman ed., Zed Books 2004); see also Ziai, supra note 122. 
124 Though Margot Badran argues that the division between the two is by no means clear (Badran, supra 
note 51). 
125 Joseph, Gendering Citizenship, supra note 57. 
126 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 113. 
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rather than the individual is constructed as the basic unit of society.
127
 Mounira Charrad 
argues that personal status laws are a key element in constructions of the legal self, 
determining whether the person is defined primarily as an autonomous individual or as a 
member of a patrilineage.
128
 Thus, when Tunisia amended its law to allow women to act 
as their own guardians in selecting a spouse, the right to marry was shifted from a right 
ascribed to the patrilineage, to one belonging to the individual woman.
129
  
This move on the part of the Tunisian government to define personal status rights 
as belonging to individual women is, however, an unusual one in the region. In most 
states personal status codes construct men as autonomous and women as dependent.
130
 
Examples of common family law provisions cementing these roles include the injunction 
of a wife’s obedience to her husband; a husband’s power over his wife’s right to work 
and travel; the ability of men to divorce their wives without recourse to the courts, while 
at the same time requiring women to apply to court for divorce and to meet very specific 
conditions in order to initiate such proceedings; and the granting of half the share of 
family inheritance to women as to men. It is clear to see that within this context women 
are regarded as both less than men and as not in need of a separate public identity or an 
independent legal relationship to the state since all rights are granted through the 
mediation of male family members.
131
 As such women are prevented from exercising 
authority over their own lives and persons in equal measure to men.  
                                                        
127 CRTD, supra note 93. 
128 Mounira M. Charrad, Becoming a Citizen: Lineage Versus Individual in Tunisia and Morocco, in 
GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 57. 
129 Id.  
130 Hatem, supra note 80. 
131 CRTD, supra note 93. Women’s lack of direct relationship to the state is exemplified in Jordan’s 
Passport Law, which bars a woman from obtaining a separate passport without her husband’s written 
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Fawzy argues that personal status laws reflect the directions of social momentum, 
and both reveal and mirror women’s status and position within a given society.132 Taking 
it to a more personal level, Homa Hoodfar writes that “it is in the area of family code . . . 
that every woman experiences on a daily basis her relegation, in the name of ‘Islam’ and 
religious dictate to lesser citizenship and personal status.”133 It is for these reasons that 
personal status codes have become a primary battleground in the struggle for gender 
equality in the MENA region, as women’s rights organizations and liberal-minded 
lawyers, judges and Islamic scholars throughout the region have fixed on this area of the 
law as central to the perpetuation of women’s status as second-class citizens. Many locate 
equity and democracy in marriage, divorce and parenthood as the “cornerstone of full 
citizenship for women,”134 and note that while women are regarded as inferior and are 
excluded from decision-making within the family, it will remain impossible for them to 
attain equal status in the public sphere.
135
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
permission, as well as provisions requiring a woman’s marriage to be negotiated by a male guardian (wali). 
Additionally, under Jordanian law, family registry books - used for all transactions related to the claiming 
of entitlements from the state (ie, bread subsidies, voting cards, documentation, school registration) - are 
issued in the name of (what is assumed to be the male) head of household. This means that not only is a 
family’s access to state-issued rights limited to its male representative, but women who have been widowed 
or abandoned or are married to non-Jordanians have been unable to benefit from citizenship entitlements. 
This provision has recently been amended to allow divorced and widowed women to obtain their own 
registries, but those married to non-Jordanians are still excluded (Amawi, supra note 108). 
132 Fawzy, supra note 123, at 17 (paraphrasing Nasser Hamed Abu Zeid, Dawar’ir al-khauf; qira’a fi 
khitab al-mara’a, Beirut; markaz al-thiqafi al-‘arabi, 1999, 283). 
133 Homa Hoodfar, Iranian Women at the Intersection of Citizenship and the Family Code: The Perils of 
“Islamic Criteria”, in GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 57, at 300.  
134 Id. at 304. Hoodfar notes that while this is an opinion that was at one time expressed largely by activists 
and intellectuals in Iran, as a result of a broadening of the public discourse on personal status laws it is 
increasingly articulated by women from diverse cultural, geographic and social backgrounds. 
135 One woman interviewed by Hoodfar under the auspices of the Women Living under Muslim Laws 
Network, Women and Law Program asked, “What does it mean for the Iranian woman to have the right to 
choose the president and members of parliament if they find themselves divorced without compensation for 
having gone to the polling stations to exercise those rights? . . . What does it mean for a woman to become 
a president or an ambassador if she has to ask for permission of her husband to leave her house to attend the 
presidential office and rule the country?” Hoodfar also notes that such arguments have been flipped and 
used by proponents of women’s position as dependents, as when a group of Iranian ulema (religious 
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Women and Law in Egypt 
Like many in the region, the Egyptian constitution guarantees equal rights to all citizens 
without discrimination, though it makes no specific mention of gender as a basis for 
discrimination.
136
 Though personal status laws do regulate relations within families, the 
lack of a uniform code within Egypt means that women from different religions are 
subject to different laws.
137
 Women are granted equal access to the courts, and their 
testimony is worth the same as men’s, though issues may arise when women find 
themselves confronted by the patriarchal attitudes of court officials and judges.
138
 Though 
women have enjoyed full suffrage since 1956, in 2003 they made up just 37.4% of 
registered voters, and the political system works against their efforts to run for office.
139
 
Labor laws have been amended to provide concessions for working mothers (including 
the provision of nurseries in workplaces, full pay for maternity leave and two years off 
for family care), but employers routinely find creative ways of circumventing such 
policies.
140
 Violence against women is not uncommon, and protection against gender-
based violence is not often guaranteed. Domestic violence is not considered a crime by 
law. While it does constitute grounds for divorce, women wanting to divorce for this 
reason are required to produce medical reports documenting the abuse. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
scholars and interpreters of Islamic law) in the 1960s argued that “a woman who does not have freedom of 
choice in her own home and is under control of her husband should scarcely be trusted with the power to 
decide the policies and laws of the country” (Id. at 296). 
136 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (September 22, 1971) (last amended March 26, 2007), 
Article 40. 
137 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 113. There was some hope among women’s rights activists that this would 
be regularized by the introduction of family courts in 2004, but it has not had that effect in practice. 
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. Hatem notes that this was the case from very early on. Labor law no. 91, passed in 1959, provided 
for day care services where there were more than one hundred female workers in any given workplace, but 
employers responded by simply avoiding hiring more than ninety-nine women (Hatem, supra note 80). 
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entrenched social attitudes surrounding domestic violence mean that it is largely ignored 
by police.
141
 Similar problems relating to societal acceptance of violence against women 
among authorities and communities have led to a lack of investigation of honor crimes 
and pressure exerted by police on women to drop charges against their rapists.
142
 
Egypt has seen recent advances in laws affecting gender equality. In 2000, the 
Egyptian Parliament passed what has popularly come to be known as the “khul law.”143 
The legislation grants women access to no-fault divorce without their husbands’ consent 
(khul), and also contains provisions on a woman’s right to a divorce from an ‘urfi 
(unofficial) marriage, witnessing and documentation requirements of talaq (men’s right 
of unilateral divorce through simple pronouncement of particular words), a woman’s 
right to travel without her husband’s consent, imprisonment of husbands for refusing to 
pay maintenance, as well as the creation of a new marriage document requiring a husband 
to disclose if he is already married, and allowing for stipulations to be written into the 
contract. 2002 saw the establishment of a gender Ombudsman’s office, while in 2004 a 
family court was established and the first female judge was appointed to the 
Constitutional Supreme Court.
144
  
                                                        
141 A 2002-3 survey by Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance found that less than half of those women 
reporting having been subject to incidences of domestic violence during that time had sought assistance 
(FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 113). 
142 Freedom House notes that while feminists did succeed in abolishing the law forgiving rapists who 
married their victims, this success has been undermined by police who not only encourage women to drop 
rape charges, but also pressure women to marry their perpetrators (Id.) 
143 The controversy surrounding the khul law will be discussed in further detail below. 
144 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 113. The ombudsman’s office was initiated to investigate allegations of 
discrimination in the workplace, personal status law and inheritance. It assigns pro bono lawyers to women 
who cannot afford to file court cases on their own. The office also investigates cases of domestic violence, 
and reportedly coordinates with the Ministry of Interior to provide training to police officers in registering 
domestic violence complaints. According to a report by the National Council for Women, the office 
reportedly received 7,000 complaints within the first two years of its existence, and was able to resolve 
40% of the cases that were brought to its attention (National Council for Women, Implementation of the 
Beijing Platform for Action: Egypt (2004), 
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Egyptian nationality law and the 2004 reform 
Why reform? 
What is it about nationality laws in the Middle East that demand reform? What does the 
current state of the law say about how women are (de)valued in their societies? What 
practical effects do discriminatory nationality laws have on women and their families? 
All of these are questions that merit examination. In an effort to understand the scope of 
the problem, the Beirut-based Collective for Research and Training on Development 
(CRTD) spearheaded a study in 2003 of citizenship law in the MENA region. At the heart 
of the study’s findings was the fact that though all countries surveyed were guided by 
constitutions theoretically committed to gender equality, their citizenship laws lay in 
direct contradiction to this commitment.
145
 And the consequences felt by women who 
made the decision to marry foreigners but remain in their own countries were both wide-
ranging and profound. 
For many such women, the first indication of any sort of problem is the refusal of 
the authorities to register their children.
146
 For many the only way to register a child is at 
the husband’s embassy, a task which only he can accomplish, and which presents 
obstacles if he is away, has divorced his wife, or if consular services are far away or there 
exist no diplomatic relations between the countries in question. In the most extreme 
cases, the child of a national mother and foreign father may be rendered stateless, but at 
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145 Lina Abou-Habib, Gender, Citizenship, and Nationality in the Arab Region, 11 GENDER & DEV. 67 
(2003). 
146 Id.  
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the very least he or she is treated as a foreigner in the mother’s country, even if it is the 
country in which the child was born and lived its entire life.  
Living as a foreigner in one’s own country carries a variety of practical 
consequences, affecting such things as the right to residence, education, employment, 
health care, property ownership and inheritance, access to state aid, and the ability to 
obtain identity documents, passports and permission to travel. Most women interviewed 
in the CRTD study spoke of the difficulties they experienced in providing education for 
their children. In Egypt, foreign children are subject to school fees of as much as six 
times the rate paid by nationals for primary education. Oftentimes such families are also 
expected to pay these inflated fees in foreign currency. If the children do manage to 
secure an education they will find themselves upon graduation subject to employment 
restrictions designed for foreigners. This means that they must obtain (and regularly 
renew) work permits in order to find official employment. This is further complicated by 
the need to acquire residency permits, a procedure which they must undergo on the same 
footing as any foreigner applying to live in Egypt.
147
 At every step, from birth registration 
to school fees to residency and work permits, women and their children come face to face 
with labyrinthine bureaucracies, endless paperwork and exorbitant fees.
148
 
Even more worrisome are the potential consequences if a mother is unable to 
acquire any documentation for her children. Particular classes of women – the poor, rural, 
and those who possess no identity documents of their own – may find themselves stymied 
by the complex processes and fees involved. And the absence of identity documents in 
                                                        
147 CRTD, supra note 93. 
148 One interviewee recounted that she spent the better part of fifteen years shuttling back and forth between 
government agency offices just to ensure that her children could receive the education their fully-Egyptian 
counterparts took for granted (Abou-Habib, supra note 145). 
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many MENA countries, where individuals are typically required to present them upon 
request, means such families live in constant fear and suffer from severe restrictions on 
their freedom of movement.
149
 A further fear for women married to foreign men is that in 
the event of divorce, they may lose custody of their children entirely and be powerless to 
prevent their husbands from taking the children back to their home countries.
 150
 
The social and psychological impact on women married to foreigners may be 
equally as damaging. The CRTD study found a lack of social acceptance within MENA 
states of such mixed marriages, particularly if the husband was non-Muslim, of a darker 
complexion, or coming from a geographically distant country.
151
 This corresponds with 
other accounts of women who found themselves repeatedly asked, “why couldn’t you 
find an Egyptian to marry?,”152 and goes to the heart of notions of national identity. 
Women who ran into barriers while attempting to procure services for their children that 
they thought ought to be automatically proffered often reported experiencing 
psychological shock, anger, trauma, humiliation and a sense of injustice.
153
 Many saw the 
refusal to grant their children nationality in their own country as a deprivation of their 
fundamental rights and a restriction of their right to live as full citizens with the freedom 
                                                        
149 Abou-Habib, supra note 145. One Jordanian teenager interviewed noted that she and others like her felt 
“like prisoners in our own homes” (CRTD, supra note 93, at 22). 
150 This fear of losing custody and even access to their children leads some women to remain in abusive 
relationships long after they would otherwise have left (CRTD, supra note 93). 
151 Abou-Habib, supra note 145. 
152 New Woman Foundation, My Nationality is My and My Family’s Right (2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHgoL08tBRA&feature=relmfu (part 1), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_VGXHkcBHk&feature=relmfu (part 2), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWEtZKF3MRo&feature=relmfu (part 3), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgrPRAP55Ic&feature=relmfu (part 4) (interview with Soumaya 
Ibrahim). 
153 Abou-Habib, supra note 145. One Jordanian woman noted the humiliating treatment she received at the 
hands of civil administrators when she said that “I am not treated like a human being when I go do my 
paperwork at the Ministry of Interior.” (CRTD, supra note 93, at 22). 
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to marry as they choose. In addition to violating their rights as individuals, they felt that 
such discriminatory nationality laws violated their rights as mothers, inhibiting their 
ability to secure basic rights for their children. And many women expressed feelings of 
guilt and regret over the unintended consequences of their choice of spouse on their 
children.
154
 
The majority of the women interviewed by CRTD, regardless of class or 
education level, reported a lack of awareness of the legal ramifications of marrying a 
foreigner prior to their decision to do so, and only discovered the consequences upon 
having their first child, or upon divorce or the death of their husbands.
155
 This highlights 
a widespread ignorance of the law and its practical impact on the lives of women and 
their children. 
 
Resistance to Reform 
As noted previously, the question of nationality is a political one, and states choose to 
proffer or withhold nationality for a variety of reasons. Some states justify the 
withholding of nationality as a response to national security concerns. In countries such 
as Lebanon this may be due to concerns over the potential destabilization of the state’s 
demographic composition,
156
 whereas in Egypt the exclusion of the children of mixed 
marriages has historically been based on a fear of dual loyalties and the perception of 
half-Egyptians, particularly those with Israeli fathers, as potentially hostile to Egyptian 
                                                        
154 One woman interviewed noted that, “I am the reason why my daughters have no future.” (Abou-Habib, 
supra note 145, at 72). 
155 CRTD, supra note 93. 
156 Abou-Habib, supra note 145. 
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interests.
157
 One may easily ask, as does Lina Abou-Habib, why these concerns are so 
often raised only in regard to the children of national women and foreign men, and not 
the other way around. The only answer seems to be that such determinations follow 
patriarchal modes of thought based on assumptions that a woman and her children should 
follow the husband and settle in his country and not the reverse. This is reflected in the 
Egyptian government’s rationale for its reservation to CEDAW article 9 (granting women 
equal rights to men with respect to the nationality of their children): 
This is in order to prevent a child’s acquisition of two nationalities where his 
[sic] parents are of different nationalities, since this may be prejudicial to his 
future. It is clear that the child’s acquisition of his father’s nationality is the 
procedure most suitable for the child and that this does not infringe upon the 
principle of equality between men and women, since it is customary for a 
woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children shall be of the 
father’s nationality.158 
 
Other justifications have included the fear of a sudden population increase and the 
resulting burden on state resources, as well as a sense that the granting of citizenship to 
the children of Egyptian women and unknown men might result in legitimation of, and an 
increase in, illegitimate births.
159
 
 
The reform itself 
The drive to amend Egyptian law to allow women to pass their nationality to their 
children began years before its successful conclusion with the passage of Law 
154/2004.
160
 Egyptian women’s organizations identified the topic as one of concern as 
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early as 1993 during their preparations for the International Conference for Population 
and Development (held in Cairo in 1994). 2001 saw an upsurge of interest in the arena of 
women’s citizenship rights in the MENA region, as the Machreq/Maghreb Gender 
Linking and Information Project (MACMAG/GLIP) identified citizenship as a key area 
in need of reform, and launched a regional reform campaign.
161
 That same year the 
Egyptian Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) 
sponsored a conference which included discussions concerning nationality law.
162
 In 
2003, the Egyptian government followed suit. That year President Hosni Mubarak 
signaled his intention to amend the 1975 Nationality Law (Law 26/1975) in a speech at 
the annual conference of the ruling National Democratic Party. The Justice Minister was 
immediately tasked with establishing a committee of experts, including representatives 
from the Ministry of Interior and the National Council for Women, to draft the 
amendment.
163
  
According to some estimates, the amendment had the potential to affect up to one 
million individuals, representing 468,000 families.
164
 Egypt’s 2008 CEDAW report 
(compiled by the National Council for Women) claimed that thousands of children of 
Egyptian women married to foreigners had obtained Egyptian nationality as soon as the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Masreya (Egyptian Proceedings) Vol. 166 bis, (July 26, 2004) and outlining the procedures by which the 
law was to be implemented. 
161 Abou-Habib, supra note 145. 
162 Hala Sakr, A Matter of Survival, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, May 3-9, 2001. 
163 Laila Reem, Citizens At Last, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, July 1-7, 2004. Fernandez notes that the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, a German NGO with an interest in improving the development situation of women 
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law was issued.
165
 Estimates from early 2010, just over five years after the amendment’s 
passage, were that 17,000 affected individuals had acquired nationality.
166
   
According to the law, acquisition of citizenship is immediate for those born after 
its enactment.
167
 Those born prior to its passage were required to submit an official 
request to the Ministry of Interior, and would automatically be granted nationality within 
a year if they hadn’t been informed otherwise. There exists some confusion regarding 
whether the law contained a statue of limitations governing how long an individual had to 
submit an application, with some sources claiming that failure to apply for citizenship 
within one year of the law’s passage would result in permanent loss of the opportunity,168 
while other sources note that individuals applying well past the year mark have had no 
difficulty in acquiring citizenship.
169
  
 
Barriers to Implementation 
Whatever the case may be, the application process for those born prior to the amendment 
does not appear to be a simple or straightforward one, requiring the submission of birth 
certificates for both the applicant’s parents, a copy of their marriage contract, as well as 
the mother’s national ID card, the applicant’s birth certificate, foreign passport, proof of 
educational qualifications and photos, and for those over sixteen, proof of residence in 
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Egypt for the previous ten years
170
 as well as a clean criminal record.
171
 Fernandez notes 
that the process “requires a tremendous amount of paperwork authenticating the origins 
of the mother.”172 The obstacles to particular categories of individuals - including poor 
and rural women, who may never have been issued birth certificates or national ID cards 
of their own, illegitimate children, who may also not have been issued with birth 
certificates,
173
 or those living far from the administrative offices where applications must 
be lodged and followed up on – seem obvious.174  
The challenges inherent in such a protracted, costly and complex process are 
compounded by a deficient implementation system as well as discriminatory 
implementation that excludes particular groups of individuals, such as the children of 
Palestinian and Sudanese fathers.
175
 Furthermore, the discretionary power granted to the 
Ministry of Interior over each application means that an individual’s chances of acquiring 
nationality rest on the willingness of Ministry employees to register and process them, a 
                                                        
170 According to Fernandez, this requirement has been lifted 
171 Reem, supra note 163. 
172 Fernandez, supra note 102, at 74. 
173 A 2008 amendment to the child law may have alleviated this particular obstacle, in that it permits 
illegitimate children to receive birth certificates in their mother’s name if the father is unknown (Freedom 
House, Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010 – Egypt (March 3, 2010), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b990125f.html. 
174 Such requirements are reminiscent of the gender-specific procedures for voter registration established 
with the 1956 Egyptian Constitution. All men were automatically registered to vote, while only those 
women who requested the right were to be registered. Women desiring to vote were required to petition the 
state to be included in the list of registered voters. This process again disadvantaged illiterate women and 
required visits to local police station where they were faced with generally uncooperative bureaucrats. This 
resulted in low numbers of women registering, which “allowed the state to claim that the right to suffrage 
was the concern of a small minority of privileged women whose political concerns were not those of the 
illiterate and depoliticized majority” (Hatem, supra note 80, at 49). 
175 Women’s Learning Partnership, Gender and Citizenship Programme: Major Developments in 2006 
(December 21, 2006), http://www.learningpartnership.org/lib/gender-citizenship-programme-major-
developments-2006.  
 51 
power that is often exercised arbitrarily.
176
 The International Observatory on 
Statelessness noted that though the Ministry of Interior began processing applications 
immediately after President Mubarak’s 2003 announcement, progress has been slow 
relative to the numbers of individuals and families affected.
177
  
Further to the challenges mentioned above, some formal restrictions do still apply. 
Though the children of Egyptian women and foreign men may be granted citizenship, 
they are forbidden from holding certain government positions or joining the army or 
police (a form of service required of all Egyptian males).
178
 And until just recently the 
children of Palestinian men were barred from obtaining citizenship regardless of the 
nationality of their mothers. This policy was purportedly meant to fall in line with the 
Casablanca Protocol of 1965, an Arab League recommendation that Arab states refrain 
from granting citizenship to Palestinians in an effort to preserve Palestinian identity and 
the right to return.
179
 It was originally written into the text of the law, but faced such 
opposition that the wording was removed. Such individuals were, however, still excluded 
in practice. This particular exclusion calls into question the overall effectiveness of the 
reform, when one considers the fact that by far the largest group of Egyptian women 
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married to foreigners is married to Palestinians.
180
 Such women continued to protest this 
unwritten restriction, taking their cases to court in an attempt to force the government to 
acknowledge that they have the same right as other Egyptian women to confer nationality 
on their children, regardless of the citizenship status of their husbands. On 2 May 2011 
the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs issued Decree No. 1231, allowing for 
Egyptian women married to Palestinian men to transmit their nationality,
181
 though it is 
as yet unclear what prompted the government to make this move. It is also unclear what 
portion of the population in question has benefited from Decree No. 1231, though 
statistics prepared for the EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship note that of the 
2,756 individuals who were granted citizenship status by the Ministry of Interior between 
the months of July and October 2011, 2,574 were the children of Palestinian men.
182
 
While on the face of it Law 154/2004 appears to be a victory in the struggle for 
gender equality in Egypt, upon deeper inspection this becomes decidedly less clear. It is a 
symbolic victory for certain – a visible step in the direction of progress. Yet it is difficult 
not to view it as anything but a half measure. Aside from the restrictions and logistical 
difficulties mentioned above, the fact remains that women are still barred from passing 
nationality to their husbands in the same way that Egyptian men are allowed to do for 
their foreign wives.
183
 Furthermore, the requirements, fees and procedures involved are in 
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fact similar to those for foreign adults applying for Egyptian citizenship,
184
 which runs 
contrary to the goals of activists who saw the amendment as a means to equalize men and 
women’s ability to pass their nationality to their children. Furthermore, the confusion 
among various sources surrounding the actual content and application of the reform 
highlights not only the difficulties inherent in keeping abreast of the law and its impact, 
but also a certain lack of commitment on the part of the state to ensure implementation of 
its own legislation. Some have gone so far as to argue that, “[w]hile commentators insist 
that the amendment signifies governmental willingness to guarantee women their rights, 
in reality it highlights an inbred reluctance to do so.”185 This may be further evidenced by 
the fact that it took the Egyptian government an additional four years to withdraw its 
reservation to CEDAW Article 9(2).
186
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
184 Women’s Learning Partnership, Egypt: Discrimination Continues Despite Law Reform (September 15, 
2009), http://www.learningpartnership.org/lib/egypt-discrimination-continues-despite-law-reform.  
185 Golia, supra note 176. 
186 Egypt withdrew its reservation to CEDAW Article 9(2) in 2008 (Freedom House, supra note 173). 
 54 
CHAPTER 3 
TACTICS FOR SOCIAL REFORM 
LAW & SOCIAL REFORM
187
 
In order to understand the place of the 2004 nationality law reform within the broader 
context of the Egyptian women’s rights movement, we must first ponder the role of law 
generally within social reform movements. Most social and legal scholars would agree 
that law cannot be divorced from society. It is simultaneously a social cause and effect, 
and exists as “part of the broader pattern of collective perception and behavior in the 
resolution of social problems.”188 As such, what may be considered the appropriate 
means of solving a particular social problem is highly dependent on a variety of factors, 
from the underlying social conditions of the time and place, to the nature of the problem 
itself, to the specific groups implicated in it.
189
 Yet while the interconnection of law and 
society may be undeniable, what is less clear is the role law can and should play in efforts 
to affect changes to the social order.  
Legal-centric analyses conceive of law as the logical battleground for social 
change, as it is in and through law that rules governing social behavior are articulated and 
enforced. According to Lawrence Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, social change follows an 
orderly and rational pattern, beginning with the definition of a social problem, followed 
by a process of continuous adjustment.
190
 This process necessarily involves recourse to 
                                                        
187 Portions of this section are taken from an unedited, unpublished paper written for a course at the 
American University in Cairo, entitled: One Tool in the Toolbox: The Role of Law in Social Change, 
(Catherine MacKay, May 2011). 
188 Lawrence M. Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COL. 
L. REV. 50 (1967), at 51. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
 55 
the law, which is viewed as an important indicator of social change and of the shifts in 
powers, duties and rights that flow from such change. Friedman and Ladinsky’s measured 
approach is echoed by Alan Hunt, who views social change as a process by which 
existing hegemonic discourses are gradually replaced by new hegemonies.
191
 Hunt views 
this process in part as a struggle for the control of law, whereby subordinate classes strive 
to achieve authority and norm-creating capacity.
192
 This approach is predicated on the 
understanding that in order to succeed, reformers must engage in struggle within the 
existing terrain, of which law forms a central component.
193
  
Those theorists situating legal processes at the heart of social change view the 
legitimation offered by law as necessary to the realization of new social claims
194
 and to 
the strengthening of the position of groups outside the fringes of power.
195
 The legal 
recognition of a right lends authority to an individual claim, and backs it up with the 
legitimate force of the state, raising its status and setting the expectation that it will be 
granted without delay or question.
196
 Joel Handler argues that litigation can be a useful 
tool for “clearing away the underbrush” of legal structures of disenfranchisement while 
raising consciousness and providing legitimacy.
197
 The enlistment of the moral authority 
of courts and constitutions in defense of a right is thus viewed as a useful tool for 
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drawing support and influencing public opinion,
198
 which in turn produces changes in 
behavior and social relations.  
Others view law more skeptically as a tactic for altering perceptions, and resist the 
notion of law as the central battleground for social change. Stuart Scheingold warns of 
the tendency of reformers to be seduced by what he terms the “myth of rights,” which 
rests on a false belief in the power and efficacy of the legal system and the ability of 
judicial declarations of rights to translate directly into social reform.
199
 Scheingold posits 
that: 
Legal frames of reference tunnel the vision of both activists and analysts leading 
to an oversimplified approach to a complex social process . . . The assumption is 
that litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from courts; that it can, further, be 
used to assure the realization of these rights; and, finally, that realization is 
tantamount to meaningful change. The myth of rights is, in other words, 
premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights, and remedies with social 
change.200 
 
Reformers who base their efforts solely in the legal arena thus fall prey to the belief that 
once established, rights and their attendant obligations are legally enforceable and 
ethically persuasive, and put us on the road to resolution of the social problem in 
question. Furthermore, such a focus, according to Scheingold, results in what is 
ultimately a superficial search for easy opportunities for legal reform of the most obvious 
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and egregious wrongs rather than a more thoughtful prioritization according to long-
range goals targeting underlying social patterns.
201
 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin goes a step further in conceiving of law and social reform 
movements as being “fundamentally in tension,”202 largely due to the fact that resort to 
the law risks undermining the necessarily insurgent nature of social reform movements. 
She distinguishes between what she terms the ‘definitional’ and ‘inspirational’ roles of 
law – when law is used to define a social movement’s goals and actions, the movement is 
robbed of its ability to introduce broader, systemic issues. Alternately, social movements 
that take inspiration from the law, using it strategically as one among many tools in a 
broader struggle for public opinion, are more likely to succeed.  
It is important to note that even the harshest critics of the centrality of law to 
social reform movements don’t advocate abandoning its use entirely, but rather view law 
as one among many tools for social change, to be used strategically as the situation calls 
for it. The fact that it cannot be ignored even by those who would most like to speaks to 
the primacy of law as an institution regulating social behavior. While many may wish it 
otherwise, it seems to be generally agreed upon that law must form some part of any 
strategy for social change. 
 
How Does Change Happen? 
Opinions regarding the centrality of law to reform efforts are invariably shaped by 
conceptions of how social change happens. The ultimate goal is a change in the way 
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people relate to each other, but the process by which that happens (and thus the means 
used to make it happen) can be understood in a variety of ways.  
Idit Kostiner, in her study of social justice activists in the San Francisco Bay area, 
speaks eloquently of how conceptions of change impact activists’ opinions regarding the 
utility of law as a means to bring it about.
203
 Those people who see social activism as a 
means to secure concrete changes in the lives of specific individuals tend to view law as a 
useful tool insofar it has the power to solve the concrete needs of marginalized 
individuals. However, it is criticized for its limitations in regard to the high cost of 
litigation and the bureaucratic hurdles that render implementation and enforcement 
difficult. Those activists who view social change in more political terms - as relating to 
systemic oppression and the distribution of power - focus on the empowerment of 
marginalized communities to unite, organize and introduce their concerns to a debate that 
is conducted largely without their input. Such reformers tend to be highly critical of law 
as reflecting the interests of the majority, reproducing social inequalities and preventing 
social change. Yet, understanding law to be a powerful institution, they recognize that it 
is difficult to ignore, and advocate for its use as a supplementary strategy to community 
organizing. Kostiner’s third category of activists view social change as being a cultural 
project of shifting personal attitudes and beliefs. Law, to them, is marginal, as it operates 
in a different realm than culture; it can reflect change, but isn’t a strategy for change. For 
these reformers, the emphasis must be on education and training, which is a deeply 
personal process, and has little to do with laws or regulation.  
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The Role of Law in Social Change 
The limitations of law as a tool for change 
Much of the debate surrounding law and social change centers on how social problems 
and their solutions are defined and framed. Legal definitions tend to be narrow and 
selective, and typically exclude alternative approaches. By translating social problems 
into legalese, the “social chemistry underneath” gets lost,204 and conversations devoted to 
dismantling the underlying attitudes that generate inequality are excluded.
205
 Once the 
issues are narrowed enough to suit the legal framework, it becomes a question of what 
has happened, but not of why.
206
 Thus resort to the law forces social movements to focus 
their agenda on a single, narrow, more easily obtainable objective, and neutralizes their 
ability to affect broader, more substantive change.
207
 
This phenomenon can be seen reflected in the shifts in feminist reform efforts in 
the post-suffrage era. Having gained the vote many feminists noted the failure of the 
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provision of such a fundamental citizenship right to bring ‘equal citizenship’ to women. 
Thus Voet notes a historical shift in the focus of feminist reform efforts from formal 
citizenship status to broader social constructions of gender roles and women’s economic 
dependency. For although women had technically gained the right to become political 
actors, they still lacked the power to participate on an equal footing with men.
208
 True 
equality would involve freedom from the social conditioning and economic dependence 
that precluded women’s full participation.209 
Madu Mehra further argues that law is often attributed with a coherence it does 
not in fact possess, which can tempt reformers into a false sense of security.
210
 Viewed in 
this light, progressive legislation may in fact be considered harmful, in that it is presented 
as evidence of progress, thus encouraging marginalized communities to abandon the 
work necessary to bring about deeper attitudinal and behavioral change.
211
 The few 
examples of progress are used as proof of overall success, thereby allowing attention to 
shift elsewhere.
212
 This critique views seemingly progressive law reform as a “safety 
valve” to diffuse pressure for more substantive reform.213  
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Intention v. implementation 
Practical reform through law is further problematized by the gap that exists between 
legislation and implementation. Without institutional support, legal reform remains 
theoretical. Policy implementation is a political process typically involving two sets of 
actors with asymmetrical access to power and resources.
214
 When prioritizing allocation 
of limited resources, implementing authorities are selective in the rules they choose to 
enforce, and they respond most to their more organized and influential constituents, who 
tend not to be the ones seeking change.
215
 Monitoring of implementation is left to the 
interested parties, which again advantages those with more resources and greater staying 
power. In the end we may observe, as did the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1959, that 
the problem often lies less in discriminatory laws than in the discriminatory application 
and administration of apparently non-discriminatory laws.
216
 
In a study of Swedish gender equality policy of the 1970s Ingrid Pincus noted a 
variety of political and administrative factors inhibiting implementation of reform.
217
 To 
begin with, the drafting of legislation is a political process involving compromise and 
often resulting in vague policies that may prove difficult to implement. Implementation at 
the local administrative level is also infused with its own politics, and is often left in the 
hands of those most affected – often adversely – by policy shifts. Such individuals are in 
a position to exercise not only the power to get things done, but also to prevent change by 
failing to act. This is a particularly salient issue in the case of gender equality policy, 
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which aims to shift power relations in favor of women, but which is typically 
implemented by men, who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Pincus 
also highlights the important distinction between women’s access to the policy drafting 
and implementation stages. She noted that women’s presence was greater during the 
former, where they were able to get gender reform policy on the agenda. Yet their 
presence at the implementation stage, in the agencies responsible for putting policy into 
action, was much less felt. This has a direct and discernible impact on the success or 
failure of implementation efforts. 
Implementing agencies tend to be large and decentralized, and often exercise 
significant discretion at the field level. Handler notes that this setup provides multiple 
opportunities for evasion, particularly if the process in question is a complicated one with 
many steps. Implementation of reform thus comes to require the obedience of a variety of 
agencies and actors, and it can be extremely difficult to monitor actions or changes in 
behavior. Handler writes that “[i]n study after study, it has been demonstrated that the 
field-level officials have within their power the ability to thwart or accept changes in 
administration,” and that implementing agencies are at the mercy of their field-level 
participants, who have the expertise, location and position from which to control relevant 
information and access.
218
 Noncompliant authorities exist at every level of 
implementation, from the judges who refuse to implement personal status laws with 
which they don’t agree (or who simply postpone all cases relating to said laws)219 to the 
doctors and village heads who falsify age certificates and marriage forms to allow for 
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women under the officially prescribed marriage age to be married off by their families.
220
 
When such agencies and individuals fail to adopt the reformist perspective, social reform 
groups are left in the position of monitors, which they typically do not have the access or 
resources to fulfill.
221
  
One of the more practical obstacles standing in the way of successful 
implementation of legal reforms and realization of rights is the labyrinth of administrative 
and court procedures required for an individual to see them to fruition. While a state may 
claim an individual has access to nationality, as we have seen, complex and costly 
administrative procedures may prohibit attainment for particular segments of the 
population.
222
 In another example, women who have been granted the opportunity to seek 
divorce in court may find themselves facing insurmountable structural difficulties, 
including the requirement that they prove that the harm inflicted by their husbands is 
intolerable. Court proceedings may last years, which again disadvantages the poor and 
those living far from administrative and court offices.
223
 Furthermore, social and cultural 
norms often discourage women from seeking redress through administrative institutions 
and courts when they find that their legal rights have been violated.
224
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Other structural factors inhibiting change  
Social and economic inequalities clearly have an impact on the ability of women to 
benefit from progressive legislation.
225
 Women’s economic and emotional dependence on 
men, their lack of time due to caring responsibilities, and the deeply ingrained social 
perceptions that render them less than men mean that the practical impact of legal reform 
becomes diluted. According to some, without first meeting certain material conditions to 
equalize the position from which men and women approach the law, the exercise of 
formal rights and liberties is not possible.
226
 Voet argues that negative freedom for all 
(i.e., the assumption that all those admitted to the ranks of the citizenry exist on an equal 
footing and therefore are both entitled and able to access citizenship rights) is inadequate 
if one group is dominant in that it possesses the positive freedom to do as it will and to 
enforce rules on another.
227
  
Many scholars point to the lack of awareness and access as among the most 
elemental barriers prohibiting women from exercising the rights granted to them under 
the law. What Amawi terms “legal illiteracy” renders women ignorant of the laws 
affecting them and unaware of their rights. A survey conducted at the time of the debate 
surrounding the proposed khul law in Egypt revealed that though the law was a topic of 
much public debate, still only 12.5% of women surveyed knew of its most significant 
provisions (compared with 22.5% of men).
228
 This is a result of a combination of high 
illiteracy rates among women (particularly among the poor and rural), which meant that 
they got their news through social interactions rather than newspapers, and their more 
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limited social circles, which impacted the likelihood of their coming across such 
information. The confusion surrounding the actual content and application of the 2004 
Egyptian nationality law reform further highlights the difficulties inherent in keeping 
abreast of the practical implications of the law. While governments may bear the ultimate 
responsibility for promulgating legislative reform, their activities fall short of raising 
awareness regarding the application of laws. This task falls largely to NGOs,
229
 which 
typically lack the resources to conduct widespread and sustained informational 
campaigns.  
 
The problems of reform from above and outside  
Reform from above 
While those in positions of authority often stand in the way of reform as a means to 
protect their own privilege, it is also important to examine what happens when 
governments and social elites are the proponents of change, and use the law to impose 
top-down reform. Sometimes this occurs out of a genuine desire to bring about change, 
while in other instances, passage of progressive legislation may merely reflect a state’s 
desire to appear as though its policies are in conformity with regional and international 
standards. There is in fact a constant push and pull, in part due to the conflicting interests 
of the state itself. The state must balance the desire to promote its own image as a 
progressive force (whether under the influence of foreign pressures or because of a desire 
to juxtapose itself against other internal political forces) against its need to placate the 
more conservative forces in society. At the same time it is in the state’s interest to rein in 
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those forces calling for radical change. Governments in the MENA region have often 
responded to this dilemma by co-opting gender equality initiatives, bringing them under 
the umbrella of state agencies as a means to show women (and the international 
community) that the state is committed to gender reform, while limiting both the shape 
and application of reform efforts and keeping them in line with broader national 
priorities.
230
 Regimes throughout the region have employed a common tactic for both 
legitimizing and controlling women’s initiatives, whereby a female relative of the current 
ruler is placed at the helm either of the state-sponsored organization tasked with 
overseeing women’s affairs231 or of efforts to pass legislation regulating women’s 
status.
232
  
Whatever the motivation, there are always difficulties inherent in top-down 
reform decisions imposed by governments and elites that fail to take social realities into 
consideration.
233
 By ignoring widespread popular sentiment, such elites underestimate 
popular opposition, and oftentimes doom their reforms to failure. This disconnect 
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becomes particularly evident during the implementation phase, for as we have seen, when 
those responsible for enforcing the law aren’t invested in reform, implementation 
becomes problematic.
234
  
Sumita Mukherjee highlights the problems associated with top-down reform in 
her study of the 1929 passage of the Sarda Act by the Legislative Assembly of India.
235
 
The law, which set the minimum age of marriage for girls at 14, was spearheaded by a 
rising generation of Indian political elites using their newfound power to pass legislation 
addressing social concerns. Arguments against the reform focused on several areas of 
concern: (1) that legislation passed in advance of public opinion doesn’t work; (2) that 
law is too intrusive and ineffective to foster genuine change; (3) that such legislation 
exemplified government interference in a religious sacrament, which shouldn’t be subject 
to penal law; (4) that reform should come through other, more direct and personal means; 
and (5) that social legislation has “no effect whatever on the people”236 since the majority 
are unaware of the law, and wouldn’t feel compelled to comply if they were (or would 
find ways to circumvent it).  
In the end the Sarda Act passed, in part due to the ability of legislators, who 
despite being perceived as an unrepresentative body of elites, were still able to frame 
their arguments in an understanding of local culture. Yet Mukherjee concludes that nearly 
eighty years after the passage of the Sarda Act child marriage remains a common social 
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practice in Indian society, which indicates that despite the appearance of success at the 
national legislative level, the attitudes underlying the practice have remained largely 
unaffected.  
 
Reform from outside  
Mukherjee’s study highlights a further complication in regard to reform efforts 
undertaken within the developing world. Reformers attempting to affect change within 
such contexts are often forced to defend against accusations of inauthenticity and cultural 
imperialism. Whether social elites or members of marginalized communities, such 
individuals are often viewed as introducing threats to society from outside. This may be 
particularly the case when calls for reform are framed in the language of human rights 
and international law, discourses which are often viewed as culturally imperialist and 
incompatible with local identity and culture.
237
  
Such notions are succinctly expressed in the term gharbzadegi, coined by Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad, and translated by Najmabadi to mean “westoxication” or 
“weststruckness.”238 This is a concept used by Iranian oppositionists (both Islamist and 
secular) that came to embrace rejection of a centuries-long modernization project through 
the demonization of anything perceived of as having been imported from the West. In yet 
another form of resistance, militant Islamists have employed class resentments against 
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reformers belonging to the privileged local elite who are perceived of as slavishly aping 
the West.
239
 
Resistance to change based on calls for cultural authenticity is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of gender equality. Women have long served to uphold the 
“myth of the nation,” both as reproducers and symbols of the national community and 
culture.
240
 To further complicate matters, the place of women and the family was often 
one of the few areas of relative autonomy left to colonial societies, which led to the 
placement of women at the center of cultural resistance to colonial domination and 
dependence on the West.
241
 Within such a context women have served as symbols both of 
the progressive aspirations of secularist elites and calls for cultural authenticity 
(expressed largely in Islamic terms).
242
 While on the one hand, “nationalist reformers and 
leaders have often used women to imagine their communities as modern” by integrating 
them into political processes,
243
 on the other hand women have also come to serve as the 
“touchstone of Western cultural contamination.”244  
These tensions often result in reliance on indigenous systems - often in the form 
of customary and/or religious law - as a means to resist change viewed as alien.
245
 Narula 
highlights the difficulties posed by the use of newer, externally-introduced legal 
institutions to combat practices that are supported by parallel normative systems with 
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longer histories and greater popular support.
246
 Within the context of women and 
citizenship, it must be noted that many post-colonial states adopted full suffrage from the 
outset as part of the importation of an international citizenship model rather than the 
evolution of a local one.
247
 The wholesale importation of foreign law and practice that 
has not had the chance to develop organically is bound to run into problems when it 
comes to acceptance and applicability. But to fluently speak the languages of both 
international human rights law and local normative systems, to successfully bridge those 
two worlds such that local communities are willing to embrace change and understand it 
as locally relevant rather than simply dictated from outside, is a daunting task. 
Reforms imposed from either above or outside may result in backlash, whereby 
communities, perceiving a threat to their way of life, their worldview, or their positions 
of privilege, not only resist reforms but push back against previous gains. Calls for 
change, viewed as threats, may have the effect of mobilizing previously silent 
populations, resulting in reactionary movements and entrenchment of the practices in 
question.
248
 Such challenges are often framed in emotionally charged terms and invoke 
religion, tradition and culture as tools to ward off the threats.
249
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SELECTING TACTICS FOR SOCIAL REFORM 
While most scholars agree that law matters to some extent in the quest for social reform, 
the difficulty lies in figuring out how it matters.
250
 In this section we will explore where 
law may find its place in social reform efforts, and amongst what other tools. 
In any discussion of social reform and the tactics employed to achieve it, it is 
important to pause to consider the goals of the particular reform movement. How success 
is defined will be key to understanding whether the tactics employed in fact fit the bill. 
Does successful reform lie in the creation or amendment of legislation, full stop? If so, 
women’s equal access to citizenship status should be considered sufficient. Or, noting the 
bureaucratic hurdles and barriers to enjoyment of citizenship rights, does successful 
reform instead depend on improved implementation and enforcement of existing policy? 
If so, targeted education and awareness-raising among implementers will be included in 
any strategy for change. Alternatively, is social mobilization the ultimate goal? If the 
active involvement of affected individuals in the processes of demanding change is the 
aim, then tactics will necessarily focus on group action among marginalized 
communities.  
Clearly, few point to the writing or reform of legislation in isolation as a sign of 
success.
251
 Even advocates of a legal-centric approach to social reform recognize that a 
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change in law does not necessarily correlate to attitudinal or behavioral change. 
Scheingold’s alternative, his resistance to the lure of the “myth of rights,” is for reformers 
to engage in what he terms a “politics of rights.”252 Such an approach situates the 
authoritative declaration of a right as the beginning of a political process, and encourages 
reformers to think of rights “not as accomplished social facts or moral imperatives, but 
rather as authoritatively articulated goals of public policy and political resources . . . in 
the hands of those seeking change.”253 As such, rights are not perceived of as ends in 
themselves, or even as a direct means toward achieving social change, but rather as 
political tools and sources of leverage for mobilization and increased bargaining power 
for marginalized groups. It is the indirect effects of legal tactics - delaying tactics, 
publicity and the raising of public awareness, shaming of governments and institutions, 
and an increase in costs to institutions that force them to change their behaviors - that 
matter most to social change.
254
 While the direct effects of reform activity through the 
law can help groups to gain access to decision-making processes, the indirect effects 
serve to “raise consciousness, diminish quiescence, cue expectations, and change the 
national agenda.”255 
This notion of the indirect benefit of engagement with the law lies at the heart of 
mobilization theory – the idea that it is through participation in legal processes rather than 
the strict recognition of particular rights that the more important change happens. 
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According to mobilization theorists, participation in the legal process (whether through 
the courts or through legislative lobbying efforts) affords a variety of opportunities to 
marginalized communities, beginning with a vocabulary within which to articulate social 
claims as rights. According to Scheingold “the declaration of rights politicizes needs by 
changing the way people think about their discontents,” transforming them from 
individual to social problems and introducing the notion that their solutions are not solely 
a matter of individual responsibility.
256
 The legitimation of claims as entitlements cues 
expectations, and contributes to the formation of political aspirations and group 
mobilization.
257
 Thus, rights discourse and litigation contribute to movement formation 
and provide a framework for attacking discrimination.
258
 Furthermore, participation may 
have an empowering effect on marginalized communities,
259
 and the organization 
required to sustain legal advocacy efforts can lead to improvement in their strategic 
position.
260
 By strategically employing “rights without illusions,”261 by recognizing the 
limitations of law while also acknowledging its ability to shape discourse, mobilize 
marginalized groups and provide some form of legitimacy, reformers may be able to reap 
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some of its benefits without falling prey to the misplaced belief that law can solve social 
problems and promote change on its own.
262
  
Group mobilization is even more central to Brown-Nagin’s concept of social 
change. In her estimation, law can only play a secondary role to consciousness-raising 
activities meant to shift public opinion and obtain a critical mass of support. Without this 
shift in attitude and the resulting political pressure, seemingly progressive laws and 
judicial decisions not only have little practical impact, but fail to address the underlying 
forms of discrimination at the heart of the social problems under debate. Thus we are 
called to revisit Kostiner’s third category of activists, those who ascribe to a “cultural 
schema” of reform. If injustice is rooted less in laws than in people’s unconscious 
assumptions and ingrained cultural biases, then change efforts must take the form of a 
long-term commitment to a process of (re)education. Kostiner’s cultural reformers stress 
that shifts in cultural attitudes can’t be legally mandated, and thus law cannot serve as a 
strategy for change.  
However, Kostiner doesn’t conceive of the three schemas observed in her study 
(instrumental, political and cultural) as existing in isolation from one another. While she 
suggests that they may be viewed on a continuum (progressing from the satisfaction of 
immediate concrete needs, to the mobilization of marginalized groups, and finally to the 
(re)formation of cultural attitudes), she also acknowledges that individuals slip in and out 
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of the different schemas depending on the needs of the moment.  And as a result, 
conceptions of the importance of law also shift as the situation demands.  
This need for flexibility is echoed in a UNICEF report on efforts to combat the 
practice of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) in five African countries 
(including Egypt).
263
 According to the report findings, efforts to convince communities to 
abandon the practice of FGM/C only succeed through a combination of national 
government policy and commitment and targeted, participatory community-based 
programs that address the complex social dynamics associated with the practice and 
allow for community discussion challenging established gender relations and the 
assumptions and behaviors surrounding them. The communities that successfully 
abandoned FGM/C did so only after considerable public debate surrounding the social 
expectations underlying the practice, and only by means of a public and community-wide 
affirmation of their commitment to cease the practice. The process involved a wide 
spectrum of community members actively engaged in conversation and typically took 
several years to complete. It is important to note that in communities where reform 
efforts were based largely on criminalization and awareness-raising in regard to the legal 
consequences attached to FGM/C, rather than on shifting the social values underlying it, 
the practice was not abandoned, but merely driven underground, where it conceivably 
presents an even greater danger.
264
 The report’s authors had this to say about the legal 
aspect of campaigns aimed at the reform of ingrained social practices: (1) in order to 
reduce resistance, legal reform must not be introduced too early in the process, before 
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other strategies; yet (2) legislation is still seen as an important tool because it signals a 
change in expectations on the part of the government; (3) punitive measures will not be 
enforced if support for the practice is high; (4) the expected loss of social rewards for 
failing to comply with social norms attached to a practice are far more persuasive 
motivators than legal sanctions; (5) legal reform only works if it forms part of a broader 
human rights reform process involving entire communities, and focused on educational, 
administrative and social measures.
265
 
 
GENDER REFORM IN THE MENA REGION 
Gender equality activists in the Middle East and North Africa have taken the debate 
regarding the utility of various tools for change to heart, and have experimented with a 
wide variety of approaches. Their efforts have met with mixed results in terms of both 
policy reform and attitudinal and behavioral change. This section will outline a number of 
tactics used by women’s rights activists throughout the region to affect gender reform. 
 
Action research 
According to Lina Abou-Habib of the Center for Research and Training on Development, 
the foundation of any campaign to reform laws and shift attitudes is research. In 2001 the 
Machreq/Maghreb Gender Linking and Information Project (MACMAG/GLIP) identified 
citizenship as a key area of concern for women’s activists in the region, yet noted that 
advocacy efforts were hindered by a lack of data in regard to the existing laws and their 
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impact on women.
266
 Research contributes to reform in a variety of ways. It provides a 
quantitative and qualitative data source for NGOs and policy-makers to use as an 
advocacy tool, highlighting both the scope and character of a problem. By focusing a 
good part of its research efforts on collecting individual stories, CRTD was able not only 
to personalize the effects of discriminatory legislation, but it was also in a position to 
empower its interviewees, many of whom went on to become spokespersons for the 
reform effort. Furthermore, the data collected provided material for the media to feed on 
and leverage to challenge myths, and gave the reformers an edge over politicians who 
were less likely to fully understand the scope and implications of nationality legislation. 
Armed with an in-depth understanding of the situation, and having mobilized the interest 
of the research participants, the reformers were then able to bring their battle to the 
public. Abou-Habib notes that, “[n]ationality has now become a big issue, a political 
issue, a media issue. When we started, it was a marginal issue. The research has 
transformed this completely.”267 
 
Networking & organizing for political action 
Based on their survey findings, CTRD and their regional partners were able to create 
solid proposals for legal reform. This stage involved providing venues to bring together 
political figures and media representatives from all the surveyed countries in order to 
discuss the research findings and devise collective plans of action. This took place on 
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both the regional and national level, with the various campaigns sharing personnel, 
participants, information, training and strategies. On the national level the Egyptian 
women’s rights organization ADEW sponsored a conference entitled “Women and Law: 
Legal and Constitutional Rights,” which served as a springboard for debate, networking 
and coalition- and strategy-formation among community development associations, 
policy-makers, media representatives and interested members of the public. The 
reformers again highlighted the personal stories of women affected by discriminatory 
nationality laws as a way to garner public support and reach the hearts of policy-
makers.
268
 The use of the media was instrumental to this process, as a means to bring 
political visibility to a social issue that had been long concealed. In addition to print and 
television, advocates in Lebanon used online media and communication technologies to 
draw on the support of the Lebanese diaspora, engaging Lebanese living abroad in long-
distance lobbying efforts and inviting them to join in direct action efforts through 
solidaristic cyber sit-ins.
269
 
In the realm of networking, Yasemin Nuhoglu Sohsal notes that organizing 
strategies have increasingly acquired a transnational character.
270
 Women’s movements 
in MENA have in the past been hampered by the lack of a regional framework or a 
formal network, as local groups have remained isolated in their efforts to address issues 
that are in fact common across national borders. Ziai highlights the utility of transnational 
networks as a means of keeping women’s rights on the agenda and developing a common 
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advocacy strategy.
271
 Maryam Elahi calls for the fusion of local women’s rights 
organizations and broader international human rights organizations, and views 
international conferences as a means to publicize reform issues, shame governments into 
making good on their promises, build networks, disseminate information and organize 
broad protest efforts.
272
 Lister highlights in particular the success of the Fourth World 
Conference for Women in Beijing, calling it a “milestone in the development of an 
internationalist feminist citizenship praxis which is now being built upon.”273 Some see 
such spaces as providing opportunities for the exercise of ‘global citizenship,’274 and an 
arena for women’s participation that is in some ways divorced from the obstacles to 
participation they may face within their own national contexts. Lister in fact argues that 
by some accounts women are actually having a greater impact on the international than 
the national level.
 275
 Whether one accepts this assertion or not, it is clear that women, 
both in the MENA region and around the world, are becoming more and more active in 
the growing phenomenon of international civil society. 
A further benefit of participation in international gatherings such as the Beijing 
conference can be found in the mobilization of local civil society organizations as they 
prepared to present findings relevant to the situation of women in their own national and 
regional contexts. This has the effect of bringing together what are often disparate and 
isolated reform efforts. In concert with this trend, part of MACMAG/GLIP’s regional 
networking strategy was to bring local NGOs together to build their capacity to fight 
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gender discrimination within their own communities. They created training tools and 
materials for NGOs to use in their awareness-raising and reform campaigns and 
encouraged the women involved as interviewees in the initial research project to form 
collective interest groups on a local level. At the same time, they formed part of a pan-
Arab advocacy campaign providing logistical, informational and tactical support to local 
initiatives. 
 
Legal advocacy and education 
Despite disagreement over its centrality to successful social reform, it is clear that law 
has a role to play. Gender equality movements in MENA have focused on the law in a 
variety of ways. On the one hand reform efforts throughout the region have focused on 
applying pressure on governments to write or amend laws that restrict women’s ability to 
act as citizens on an equal footing with men. This involves efforts to revise such things as 
criminal codes that afford less weight to women’s testimony than to men’s. As mentioned 
previously, much women’s rights advocacy has been centered on updating personal status 
codes on the premise that gender equality cannot be realized until women are afforded 
equal decision-making power within the family. Yet another tactic has been an assault on 
nationality laws that paint men as the sole (or primary) avenue to citizenship.  
One creative example of an effort aimed at producing change through law can be 
found in the Collectif Maghreb Egalite. An association of women’s organizations formed 
in North Africa in the mid 1990s, the Collectif’s aim was to develop strategies to 
counteract the invocation of religion and tradition as justifications for discriminatory 
laws. The group drafted and publicized an alternative personal status code (the 
 81 
Egalitarian Code) in an attempt to ensure compliance of shari’a-based laws controlling 
women’s lives with norms espoused in international human rights instruments.276 While 
the Egalitarian Code has not come to fruition, it does present an intriguing example of a 
transnational effort to arrive at creative legal solutions to the problems facing women. 
Gender reform advocates are increasingly coming to the conclusion that while law 
reform may be central to the drive for gender equality, it does little good to amend 
legislation to grant women rights if the beneficiaries are themselves unaware of these 
rights or how to claim them. Thus we see the evolution of projects such as Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which seeks cross-cultural discussion of the 
diverse laws and legal systems in the Muslim world and the development of practical 
strategies for increasing women’s critical understanding of the laws influencing their 
autonomy.
277
 WLUML documents gaps between formal law and social practice, 
examines variances in legal interpretation and schools of jurisprudence within national 
contexts as well as the intermeshing of legal and cultural patriarchy, and highlights the 
hypocrisy of governments that make public commitments to instruments such as 
CEDAW while failing to modify discriminatory personal status laws. On a national level, 
legally-centered efforts by the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) Legal 
Empowerment and Aid Program focuses in part on conducting legal rights trainings, 
publication of simplified information on important laws for women, direct assistance to 
women involved with the legal system, and a planned monitoring center to track 
                                                        
276 Ziai, supra note 122. 
277 Seema Kazi, Muslim Law and Women Living Under Muslim Laws, in MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE 
POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION, supra note 119. 
 82 
women’s experiences with the legal system.278 These two projects serve as examples of 
efforts to not only understand the impact of law on women’s lives, but also to draw 
individual women into the conversation and to give them the tools to make the law work 
for them. 
 
Shifting attitudes and behavior through awareness-raising  
In order that women are able to claim their rights, they must not only be aware of those 
rights, but must also have an understanding of themselves as autonomous individuals 
with the capacity to demand application of the law. Such awareness and understanding is 
heavily influenced by an increasingly accessible transnational media. Even without 
concerted efforts on the part of reform advocates, women the world over are more and 
more finding themselves exposed to alternative images of female modes of acting and 
being. This undeniably has an impact not only on how women view themselves, but also 
on how society as a whole views them.
279
 This of course can have a variety of effects, as 
on the one hand women may be inspired by alternative visions of womanhood and 
women’s participation, while on the other hand exposure to the media influences of 
dominant cultures can produce backlash and lead to accusations of cultural inauthenticity 
and a retreat to ‘traditional’ forms of being and behaving. Yet it is undeniable that the 
increasing forms, reach and speed of the modern media has rendered it an important tool 
for reform advocates. From the days of dissemination of feminist ideologies through a 
women’s press with limited reach, women’s rights organizations have graduated to the 
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use of television, radio, print and online media as part of broad-based public awareness 
campaigns. Television and radio become particularly important information-
dissemination tools when one considers literacy rates among populations of concern, 
specifically poor urban and rural women with little access to formal education. The use of 
such awareness-raising tools serves to spark debate in kitchens and coffee shops as well 
as parliamentary halls, and thus does more to promote shifts in general public opinion 
than the imposition of legal reforms by the learned few in spheres of influence far 
removed from people’s daily lives.  
Awareness-raising takes a variety of forms and can be targeted at specific 
stakeholders to achieve particular goals. While general media campaigns are useful in 
sparking debate and garnering broad support, other tools may be geared to more specific 
audiences. In the rush to influence policy makers, gender equality advocates have 
increasingly turned to documentary filmmaking as a means to tell the individual and 
immediate stories of women and families negatively impacted by discriminatory policy 
and procedures. Testimonies from living, breathing Egyptian women from a variety of 
backgrounds were used in the nationality law campaign in order to bring the practical 
impact of laws prohibiting women from passing nationality to their children into sharp 
focus and into the consciousness of policy makers who might not otherwise have come 
face to face with such realities. Handler characterizes this tactic as the strategic selection 
of issues with what he calls the highest “outrage quotient,” and notes that it can be a very 
effective strategy in shifting public opinion.
280
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Smaller scale person-to-person initiatives focused on specific communities have 
also been shown to have significant practical effect. Similar to the programs mentioned 
previously in the UNICEF study, Dewedar highlights a campaign in Egypt’s rural Minya 
governorate by the Better Life Association for Comprehensive Development that focused 
on combating violence against women and FGM/C. Volunteers conducted meetings and 
home visits to discuss the practice of FGM/C, and probably most crucially, helped to 
identify alternative income for the midwives and barbers who made a good portion of 
their living by providing FGM/C services. By engaging individuals in conversation about 
the social practices that negatively impact their lives, and by presenting alternative ways 
of understanding them, activists were able to alter the community’s social consciousness 
and thereby change its behavior.
 281
 
Yet even where women are aware of their rights and are themselves willing to act 
upon them, there can be no change without the cooperation of those in power. Thus a 
woman may go to court to assert her right to divorce only to find herself confronted with 
a judge who discourages or blocks her from doing so. This highlights the need to raise 
awareness not only among women themselves, but also among the elites and 
implementers who may facilitate or block access and the exercise of rights. And so we 
note that change to the law is one step in the process, awareness of rights among the 
affected population another, yet even these taken together are not sufficient to achieve 
social change. For legal reforms to come to fruition, there must be a concerted effort to 
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target attitude and behavior shift among officials at all levels of the implementing 
process.  
 
Promoting women as decision-makers 
Other efforts to bring about gender equality focus on achieving greater female presence 
in decision-making bodies and the development of public policy.
282
 This refers not only 
to representative political bodies, but to all sites of decision-making.
283
 The idea 
underlying such calls is that the incorporation of women not only introduces a 
perspective that has traditionally been excluded from public debate, but also provides 
women with the opportunity to exercise the judgment required for political action and a 
space in which to imagine themselves in positions of authority and influence. It is argued 
that the presence of women challenges not only decision-makers themselves, but also the 
frameworks within which they work and the male bias existing in political theory and 
institutions.
284
 Such a step would require that states create the institutional conditions for 
women to share in decision-making responsibility.
285
 This is far from the current reality 
in much of the world let alone the MENA region, where we note for example that in 
Morocco and Jordan women are expressly barred from serving as magistrates delivering 
verdicts on matters related to personal status.
286
  
While the inclusion of women in positions with decision-making power is a goal 
to be applauded, such arguments are too often focused on representative bodies alone, 
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and fail to take into consideration non-political sectors where important decisions are 
made, as well as mid- and field-level positions. As previously noted, successful 
implementation of reform requires the presence of reform-minded individuals not only at 
the policy drafting level, but also at the field level, where implementation is either 
encouraged or stymied by individuals with broad discretionary power. Furthermore, calls 
for gender quotas in representational bodies (Egypt’s included) have often been 
manipulated by political regimes as a means to install members of their own parties, who 
are often more loyal to the party line than to the genuine interests of women. 
 
Woman-centered interpretations of Islamic law 
Any discussion of women’s rights in the MENA region must engage with Islam as a 
distinct and deeply felt influence in women’s lives. Kandiyoti goes so far as to say that 
Islam is the “sole paradigm” within which to discuss the issues.287 One critique within 
Muslim feminist circles that has garnered increasing attention is the lack of women as 
interpreters of scripture. Seema Kazi notes a tradition of “male monopoly over 
(mis)interpretation” of religious texts in Muslim societies,288 while Nimat Hafez 
Barazangi writes that women’s right to exercise authority within their own lives is 
compromised by the fact that they rely on others’ interpretations of scripture.289 She 
draws a parallel within institutional Islam between the mediation of women’s relationship 
to the state and that of their relationship to God, one exercised by male relatives and one 
by imams and other religious authorities. Many argue that if women living in the Muslim 
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world are ever to see positive change they must gain access to the discourse that shapes 
interpretation of the religious law that governs their everyday lives. Afkhami and Friedl 
note that Muslim women are in fact increasingly claiming the right to interpret law and 
religious texts themselves, in the hopes of finding justifications within Islam for 
individual freedom and women’s rights.290 Barazangi argues that before introducing 
Muslim women to concepts from outside the realm of Islamic belief they must “realize 
their own part in understanding Islam,” which she sees as the only way to achieve real 
and participatory change in the Muslim world. Her answer is the granting of women’s 
full access to Islamic higher learning as their best opportunity to effect change.
291
 
To this effect, Homa Hoodfar highlights efforts by activists in Iran to achieve 
change through woman-centered interpretations of Islam and the political concept of 
“Islamic justice.”292 Firstly, they focused strategically on the family code, since women 
commonly experience it as relegating them to second-class status, rendering it a realm 
that would resonate with a broad base of potential supporters and beneficiaries. Secondly, 
Hoodfar notes that by framing their challenge to the family code in the language of Islam 
and Islamic law principles, Iranian women have been able to turn their issues into hotly 
debated political issues and push legislative bodies and Islamic ideologues into defensive 
positions. By distinguishing Islam and Muslim tradition from man-made interpretation, 
gender reform advocates have created a political space within which to challenge the law. 
In order to bring about such change, women have worked in informal, decentralized 
groups to lobby the public rather than the government through the publicizing of cases of 
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“legal injustice” done to women in the areas of divorce and custody in the Islamic family 
court. They have made their message accessible to the public by using a simple writing 
style and by telling the personal stories of women with little overt political commentary. 
And significantly, they have backed up their arguments with religious texts, which has 
allowed them to draw in women who might otherwise perceive a contradiction between 
their religiosity and the desire to improve their social and legal position. By appealing to 
as broad a base as possible, advocates are able to draw more people into the conversation, 
thus applying greater pressure to the government.  
The use of such tactics led to the successful passage of a wages for housework 
law in Iran in 1992. By arguing that women, like all other Muslims, are entitled to the 
fruit of their labor on the grounds that Islam is against exploitation, activists were able to 
undercut conservative theological opposition. By backing their argument up with sound 
Islamic law reasoning and garnering popular support, they were able to lobby 
successfully for a change to the law. Hoodfar notes that even given imperfect 
implementation the law provides women with a better bargaining position; it has 
symbolic value in that it stresses that women’s labor should not be taken for granted. 
Furthermore, she argues that given the position of shari’a as the single greatest 
impediment to women’s full citizenship, the significance of these women’s achievement 
“rests in their contesting the monopoly of male theological interpretation and producing a 
women-centered view of what are to be understood as Muslim women’s rights and legal 
status.”293 
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Reform begins at home? 
Soraya Altorki sees the fight for gender equality as a very personal process, beginning 
with change in the family and extending to society as a whole. In her view, “as women 
successfully renegotiate their rights and status in the family, their success will inevitably 
become part of the national agenda as more men of the younger generation accede to 
women’s demands at home for more effective authority. As the relationship begins to 
equalize in the family, it will begin to have an effect on other domains.”294 While there is 
much to be said for this personalized approach (similar to the approach taken by 
Kostiner’s cultural activists), one is left to wonder how Altorki’s initial step of successful 
renegotiation of rights within the family is meant to happen. As we have seen, personal 
status laws have remained stubbornly resistant to liberalization throughout the MENA 
region, leaving women with little institutional support in their attempt to assert their 
rights within the family. Furthermore, it is clear from UNICEF’s study of successful 
FGM/C abandonment programs that individuals are unlikely to shift their behavior unless 
they are provided with alternative means of receiving the social rewards attached to 
particular practices. This involves a community-wide conversation about the values 
underlying certain behaviors. Thus, while Altorki is not wrong in noting that social 
change is as much about shifting personal beliefs and behaviors as it is about amending 
laws and institutional procedures, it seems that the best way forward is via a targeting of 
shared community values using a combination of individual reflection, community 
dialogue, and public commitment to change (including through the law). 
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GENDER REFORM IN EGYPT  
While it is firmly ensconced within the MENA region, and faces many of the challenges 
outlined above, Egypt of course boasts its own personal history of gender reform. Margot 
Badran writes of the emergence of a feminist discourse in the 19
th
 century writings of 
privileged urban women who gained exposure through expanded education and the 
broadening of contacts with women of other social and national backgrounds.
295
 This 
discourse expanded with the emergence of a distinct women’s press and was focused 
around the dual poles of Islam and nationalism. Egyptian feminists began to question 
whether in fact patriarchal constraints were religiously based, as they had been led to 
believe, and argued for increased emphasis on ijtihad (independent inquiry into the 
sources of religion) as a framework for feminist discourse. Thus feminist arguments were 
increasingly grounded in the notion that women had for too long been deprived of the 
legitimate rights accorded to them by Islam, and centered around the reclamation of those 
rights as a prerequisite for the advancement of the nation as a whole. 
Egyptian feminist writings reached a more mainstream audience beginning in the 
early 20
th
 century as they began to be published in the progressive nationalist party 
newspaper, and feminist ideologies were increasingly expressed within a broader 
nationalist discourse. The 1919-22 revolution saw a temporary unity between feminist 
and nationalist positions and the encouragement of women’s participation in the public 
realm. However Badran notes that in the end male nationalist leaders failed to make good 
on their promises to integrate women into public life.
296
 Still, feminists began to focus 
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more on a demand for access to public space (through rights to education, employment 
and worship in mosques) as well as reform of the personal status law. Access to 
employment (in certain types of jobs) proved the easiest to justify as it coincided with the 
state’s nation-building priorities, while amendments to the personal status law remained 
merely aspirational for decades to come.
297
 The 1952 revolution spurred efforts to change 
fundamentally the role of women through the introduction of legislation dealing with 
women’s political, social and economic rights and responsibilities.298 Reformers argued 
that laws must change as the needs and conditions of society shift, and since women were 
now contributing to public opinion they should be give the opportunity to fully 
participate in the political arena.
299
 A combination of reformist trends among prominent 
Al-Azhar trained theologians (viewed as the highest authority in Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence) and direct feminist action including a sit-in at Parliament and a hunger 
strike, led to the granting of political rights to women (including the vote) in the 1956 
Constitution. This was followed by a series of laws promoting increased legal and social 
equality.
300
 
Yet despite these gains, just fifteen years later the amended 1971 Constitution 
signaled a return to more conservative cultural definitions as the revolutionary phase 
initiated with the Free Officers Movement in 1952 drew to a close.
301
 While the new 
constitution did spell out a policy of non-discrimination, it also firmly and explicitly 
established shari’a as the source of all legislation and reference point for women’s roles, 
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and affirmed the state’s pursuit of a “balance and accord between a women’s duties 
towards her family on the one hand and towards her work in society and her equality with 
man in the political, social and cultural spheres on the other without violating the laws of 
the Islamic Shari’ah”302 
The ambivalence of the Egyptian state and society toward gender reform can be 
observed in the controversy sparked by a 1979 presidential decree relating to the personal 
status law. The decree was hailed by some as a progressive move, and included an 
expansion of women’s ability to initiate divorce, additional protections for women in 
divorce, as well as controls on polygyny. It came to be called popularly ‘Jihan’s Law’ 
after the President’s wife, Jihan Sadat, who was an outspoken proponent of the reforms 
contained in the decree. The law sparked intense opposition, mostly based on its 
perceived contravention of shari’a, and in 1985 it was cancelled by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. In one regard Jihan’s Law highlights the difficulties inherent in law 
promulgated from above (and arguably outside), as critics used what they saw as the 
intervention of the president’s wife in the formulation of law to reject the law itself, 
though it undeniably brought benefits to women.
303
 However, even upon the law’s 
cancellation the battle was far from over. Within two months feminists responded with a 
collective political action, and as a result a new law was passed restoring most of the 
benefits contained in the original decree. While internal disagreement within Egypt could 
have seen the issue bounced back and forth endlessly, some have argued that the ultimate 
success on the part of feminist activists was related in part to pressure on the Egyptian 
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government provided by international attention to gender issues garnered by the 
upcoming Third UN Forum on Women, which took place in Narobi in 1985. 
2000 saw another controversial victory for gender reform advocates in Egypt, 
with the passage of the ‘khul law,’ which afforded a woman the right to file for no-fault 
divorce (khul) without the consent of her husband, whereas previously her only 
justification for filing for divorce was if she could prove serious injury. Access to khul 
was considered a significant breakthrough for women, though many have pointed out that 
the law as written is flawed in that it requires the woman to surrender all property given 
to her by her husband (including her dowry), which makes it largely inaccessible to poor 
women and those without the resources to support themselves after divorce.
304
  
As with the 1979 Presidential decree, the ‘khul law’ was the cause of much public 
debate. Fawzy notes that it caused a general sense of unease, based on a concern that it 
would have a destabilizing effect on the Egyptian family. Opponents often relied upon 
arguments that the timing for such reform was not right, that Egyptian society was not 
ready for such changes to gender relationships, that women were not yet mature enough 
to make good use of such rights, and that placing them in women’s hands would lead to 
the destruction of their families.
305
 Much of the debate centered around who should have 
the authority to make decisions affecting the family, the husband or the courts. This is in 
addition to the many objections on religious grounds put forward by those who saw the 
law as in direct contravention of shari’a. While the NDP’s official party position was in 
support of the law, it found itself at odds with many of its individual members in the 
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People’s Assembly, who were at that time facing upcoming elections and wanted to 
appear as defenders of religion, a position that invariably garners constituent support in a 
country where the majority of the population is religiously conservative.
306
  
Yet despite considerable opposition (and some concessions in regard to the final 
wording), gender reform advocates did win a significant battle with the passage of the 
law. Freedom House attributes successful gender reform efforts in Egypt through the 
years (and the khul law in particular) in large part to the work of an active civil society 
and a relatively effective women’s rights movement that has been working for decades to 
affect change in the law and improvements in women’s access to justice and citizenship 
rights.
307
 Passage of the khul law has also been attributed in part to the international 
embarrassment faced by the Egyptian government in regard to personal status law as it 
existed at the time, as well as to the state’s desire to avoid what had become a significant 
number of personal status cases brought before the courts by women challenging existing 
law.
308
  
Still others note, however, that though the khul reform was in fact the work of 
many years and various individuals and groups, it would not have passed through 
parliament without the endorsement of the National Council for Women and its head, 
Suzanne Mubarak, who exercised her considerable political leverage with the NDP to 
bring it to fruition. This highlights a serious challenge faced by feminists in post-uprising 
Egypt. While the NCW has played a central role in reforms affecting women, it is a 
controversial body and faces scathing criticism by many both within and outside the 
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women’s rights field. This is largely to do with its perceived co-optation into the state 
apparatus (personified by Suzanne Mubarak’s relation to her husband, the former 
president).
309
 Many view the NCW as a puppet of the Mubarak regime, which creates a 
two-fold problem for any reforms advanced by the organization. On the one hand, 
feminists criticize the NCW as being a tool in the government’s agenda of slow, partial, 
face-saving reform, as well as a means to boost the image of its members and of the 
regime itself. Governmental constraint of NGO activity focusing on women’s rights is a 
complaint of many activists, and strict registration requirements subject such 
organizations to the hegemonic position of the NCW, and what many see as its 
government-approved agenda of half measures.
310
 To that effect, since the fall of the 
Mubarak regime some have called for the reformation of the NCW as an elected body 
that would more accurately represent Egyptian women.
311
 On the other hand, opponents 
of gender equality efforts have fixed their sights on dissolving the NCW entirely and 
dismantling what have been popularly termed “Suzanne’s laws,” most of which relate to 
the status of women, and which Islamist opponents assert to be in contradiction of shari’a 
law.
312
 Women’s rights activists have noted with alarm various issuances of post-uprising 
decrees relating to family laws, which have been accompanied by inflammatory claims 
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that such laws are the sole work of Suzanne Mubarak and the NCW.
313
 By associating 
progressive family laws (and women’s rights issues in general) with a corrupt and 
discredited regime motivated only to serve the interests of elites, such actors attempt to 
capitalize on anti-Mubarak sentiment as a means to turn back the clock on gender 
reform.
314
 As problematic as Suzanne Mubarak’s involvement has been, however, it 
cannot be denied that her close association with the former regime played a role in its 
promulgation of legislation benefitting women. Without her at the helm, it is as yet 
unclear how effective the NCW will be in its continued efforts to lobby for women’s 
rights.
315
 
Thus we can see that despite the progress made so far, gender reform advocates in 
Egypt find themselves facing an uphill battle. Obstacles to change include general 
political and economic conditions throughout the country that restrict the freedoms of all 
citizens, regardless of gender; a patriarchal social environment; rising religious 
extremism; a lack of implementation mechanisms; limited female influence at the 
national and community levels; lack of state support for calls for greater participation of 
women in the political system; and the association of progressive gender legislation with 
the former First Lady.
316
 Fawzy characterizes deeply ingrained societal images of 
women, which many women have themselves come to adopt, as the most fundamental 
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obstacle to attempts to develop the position of women in Egypt.
317
 When the resistance to 
change comes from women themselves, it becomes incredibly difficult to dislodge. Yet 
even where women do make public demands for a greater share in the national 
conversation, ingrained societal notions of women’s proper place arise to resist them. 
This has become evident in the wake of Egypt’s recent political uprising. Though women 
played an active and highly visible role in the public demonstrations that led to the 
ousting of President Mubarak in early 2011, the violent response to their public stand just 
a few months later on International Women’s Day indicates how far they have yet to go. 
And despite their presence on the front lines of protest, they have been excluded almost 
entirely from the official bodies tasked with remaking Egypt’s political future. Given 
such realities, it is clear that there is much work to be done not only to retain and garner 
future legal gains, but also to dismantle the attitudes that lie at the heart of gender 
discrimination in Egypt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
317 Fawzy, supra note 123. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EGYPT’S NATIONALITY LAW REFORM THROUGH THE EYES OF THE 
REFORMERS 
As a means to uncover the broader goals of the reformers involved in the nationality law 
campaign, and to understand the place of law reform within the context of the Egyptian 
gender equality movement, I interviewed seven women’s rights activists. All were 
women, and they ranged in age from the mid-twenties to mid-sixties. Four were 
personally involved with the nationality law campaign from its earliest stages, one was 
tangentially involved as the campaign gained momentum, and the remaining two were 
not directly involved but represent women’s rights organizations that either played a 
direct role or are involved in the struggle for gender equality in Egypt. My goal through 
the interviews was to understand the reformers’ views on social change and how it is best 
achieved, and how this understanding impacts their tactical choices in confronting gender 
inequality. I sought to understand what role they ascribed to law in their efforts for 
reform, and to place the use of law amongst other tactics used to effect change. The 
following is my analysis of those conversations. 
 
Who are the reformers?  
The success of any reform movement is dependent in part on the profile and position of 
those calling for reform. The linking of feminist movements in the MENA region with an 
‘enlightened’ indigenous middle class318 has ramifications, both positive and negative, for 
chances of success, as members of such groups ride a fine line between insider and 
                                                        
318 KANDIYOTI, WOMEN, ISLAM AND THE STATE, supra note 51. 
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outsider in Middle Eastern societies. On the one hand educated middle class women have 
access to institutions and centers of power that allow them to influence policy more 
effectively than their poorer and less educated counterparts. They are more likely to 
speak the language of international human rights and to be able to connect with and draw 
on the support of international institutions. They are more familiar with the tools 
necessary to influence change, such as the media, and are more conversant in their 
language and idioms. These factors render them not only more able to influence change, 
but also grant them a privileged position within the movement. As Brown-Nagin notes, 
this power allows them to dominate and shape the discourse of change.
319
 Sharifah Tahir 
sees this phenomenon at work in the Middle East, where she notes that decision making 
within women’s movements is typically concentrated in a small core group, resulting in 
the marginalization of diverse concerns.
320
 She argues that women’s groups must broaden 
their leadership in order to make it more representational of different sectors of society 
and their various interests. Furthermore, while their position of privilege may enhance 
such women’s ability to shape and affect change, it also isolates them from the majority, 
which as we have seen in our discussion of reform from outside, has the potential to 
sabotage their efforts if they are viewed as culturally inauthentic. 
The activists interviewed for this study certainly fit the educated elite profile. All 
had obtained at the very least a Bachelors Degree (two had completed a PhD) and had 
been employed for years outside the home in a variety of fields, from development 
consultancy to research to medicine to economics. All had at one point or another 
                                                        
319 Brown-Nagin, supra note 202. 
320 Sharifah Tahir, Leadership Development for Young Women: A Model, in MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE 
POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION, supra note 119. 
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traveled outside of Egypt, some for employment reasons, but most as part of their 
graduate or postgraduate studies.
321
 All spoke English and were highly conversant in the 
language of international human and women’s rights. Some of the interviewees were 
young and new to the field of social activism while others had been involved in social 
reform efforts for years as volunteers, consultants, trainers, community advisors, and 
researchers. All were either founding members of, or professionally employed by, local 
civil society organizations working on behalf of women’s rights.322  
Two of the interviewees were personally invested in the nationality law campaign 
in that they had married foreigners prior to 2004 and had children who had been denied 
Egyptian nationality. In some regard this lends credence to the argument that motherhood 
is often the vehicle for women’s political citizenship. Yet while both women noted the 
difficulties faced by their children in terms of access to education, employment and travel 
as well as alienation from a country they felt was their own,
323
 both also came to this 
particular campaign from a broader feminist frame of mind as activists and members of 
feminist civil society groups. One of the two said that throughout the campaign, “I always 
introduced myself as an activist and a victim as well,” while the other noted that being 
                                                        
321 Two had spent a significant amount of time in Saudi Arabia, one in France, one in the U.S., one in the 
U.K., and one split between the Netherlands, the U.K. and Sudan. 
322 This includes the Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW), the New 
Woman Foundation, the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights, the Forum for Women in Development, and 
Nazra for Feminist Studies. 
323 One had this to say regarding the obstacles she and her children faced: “I encountered with all this 
everyday in bits and pieces . . . the sky was the limit. Out of the blue, problems arose . . . For example if we 
were traveling within Egypt [my children] were always dealt with as foreigners . . . in the buses when my 
children had to get out their Austrian passports . . .We had to pay the school fees in hard currency, and 
triple the Egyptians. The same with the health issues as well. Everything, they were charged as foreigners. 
So there were problems unexpected, out of the blue . . . Nobody could name the problems, the range of the 
problems . . . It’s nothing theoretical. It’s a problem that affects daily life . . . I was raising them as being 
Egyptians . . . because they are Egyptians, I simply wanted them to feel Egyptian. But it turned out that 
they’re NOT Egyptians, by law.” 
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personally affected by the issue lent her words a certain authenticity when it came to her 
public advocacy work. She did note, however, the need to incorporate a number of 
different perspectives among the advocates, as those who are personally affected can also 
be perceived of as working only in their own self-interest, rather than for the wider public 
good. This reflects a common characterization of women as focused on the particular 
rather than the broader conversations more closely associated with public political 
discourse.  
It should also be noted that, as one woman pointed out, the campaigners were 
careful to frame calls for reform to the nationality law in terms of the right of women to 
pass their nationality to their children rather than the right of the children to nationality, 
which is often the way such arguments are articulated. By framing the issue thus, they 
pulled the focus away from the family and placed it squarely on the woman as an 
individual with her own rights as a citizen. It is plain to see how such an argument fits 
neatly into international human rights discourses, but it is also evident that by choosing to 
frame their argument in terms of women’s rights as individuals, the reformers isolated 
themselves from a socio-political tradition that privileges the family over the individual, 
and within which individual rights are often viewed with suspicion. 
Another element of the reformer profiles that may have served to set them apart 
from mainstream Egyptian socio-political discourse is their secularist bent. According to 
Azza Karam there are three strains of feminist action for gender reform in Egypt.
324
  The 
‘Islamist’ strain functions through the recognition and rectifying of oppression of women 
                                                        
324 Azza M. Karam, Women, Islamisms, and State: Dynamics of Power and Contemporary Feminisms in 
Egypt, in MUSLIM WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION, supra note 119. 
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through recourse to Islamic principles. Alternatively, ‘Muslim’ feminists argue for the 
applicability of human rights principles within an Islamic cultural context, and call for the 
reinterpretation of shari’a in light of modern needs. Secular feminists ground their 
arguments solidly within the language of international human rights and reject religion as 
a basis for forming agendas on women’s emancipation. All of the reformers interviewed 
for this study fall solidly within the secular feminist camp, articulating their arguments 
for gender equality through an international human rights vocabulary. Understanding the 
context within which they were operating, they did formulate religiously-based 
counterarguments to support their calls for reform, but this was largely in response to the 
resistance of Islamists, and did not form a central element of the reform campaign. It is 
certainly possible to argue that had they made greater efforts to incorporate religious 
justifications for the change they sought, they might have succeeded in drawing in a 
broader base of the Egyptian public, thus granting them the opportunity to more 
profoundly impact underlying attitudes and behaviors. 
 
Defining social change 
When asked to define social change in their own words, the participants provided a 
variety of perspectives. One highlighted the all-encompassing nature of social change, 
noting that economics and politics in addition to personal and psychological issues are all 
tied to the social realm and therefore are implicated in social change. Seen from such a 
wide perspective, she noted that as a social reform advocate, “you don’t stop anywhere.” 
Others focused on the shifting of behaviors and attitudes and highlighted the democratic 
nature of social change, in that attitude shifts can only be achieved through democratic 
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means in consultation with members of the society at large and drawing them into 
decision-making processes. Working under this assumption, one woman was adamant 
that, “for me it’s working with the people, never working for the people.” Yet others 
focused on notions of personal liberty, stating that social change comes through the 
granting of space to individuals to do as they wish rather than as society dictates, and of 
the capacity of individuals to know what they want and to express their desires. One 
interviewee focused on the need for more just economic policies and the reduction of 
difference between citizens. In her estimation, equality will be impossible to achieve 
without radical change resulting in a complete overhaul of existing economic and 
political structures. Still another made a distinction between social and political change, 
observing that social change was impossible to achieve in pre-uprising Egypt, where 
change was not pursued for purposes of the public interest, but rather in the interest of the 
regime. This type of change is what she terms ‘political change,’ while the possibility of 
‘social change’ has only been opened up since the Egyptian uprising as activists and 
NGOs have gained greater access to the national political conversation.  
 
The means of achieving change 
An individual’s definition of social change will of course have an impact on what means 
she will use to achieve it. The women interviewed focused on a variety of methods, many 
of which were predicated on being in tune with the public at large. This begins with 
understanding the reality of a social problem and how those affected by it perceive it and 
its impact on their lives. One participant noted that “whatever I offer has to be 
applicable” to the lives of women and must take into consideration both whether the 
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problem in question is in actuality a concern for them, as well as the realities of what is 
and is not negotiable. Such notions are predicated on achieving and maintaining ties to 
large and diverse groups of individuals, and on the avoidance of restricting oneself to an 
elite perspective. After ascertaining the issues of concern to members of the society, one 
may then focus on awareness-raising and mobilizing. One interviewee based her methods 
for social change on the people’s right to organize and to engage with their right to 
expression. Much like supporters of participatory citizenship models and mobilization 
theorists, she notes that, “[w]hen people organize around something they get stronger and 
stronger. Their voices, sooner or later, come out. They join with others, and they become 
a movement.” It is only through such processes that people discover their potential and 
social change becomes possible.  
The role of civil society in this process of mobilization was a common theme 
amongst the interviewees. One perceived of civil society as playing a “structural role in 
empowering and developing society, and developing people to be active subjects.” She 
highlighted the role of such organizations in developing citizens not only in terms of their 
formal rights to vote, but in regard to more active citizenship and the running of society 
as a whole. One of the central obstacles to this approach in Egypt is of course the tight 
state control of civil society, which circumscribes its role and its ability to reach out to 
the broader population.  
Running through many of the conversations was the theme of inter-agency 
collaboration, or lack thereof. One participant highlighted the need for civil society 
organizations to network, such that they may speak with a united voice on issues of 
concern to women. Many praised the nationality law reform campaign for what they saw 
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as unprecedented collaboration between agencies working on the problem from different 
angles. The combined voices of so many agencies (as well as the individual citizens they 
were able to mobilize) was perceived of as having a positive impact on the eventual 
outcome of the campaign. The interaction between NGOs and the government was 
viewed in different ways, with one interviewee stressing both the need for NGO 
participation in international conferences as a means to publicize national struggles and 
pressure the government to act, as well as the need for increased cooperation between the 
government and NGOs, particularly in post-uprising Egypt, where she sees a government 
increasingly responsive to internal actors. 
For those who view gender inequality as one among many forms of social 
inequality, the struggle for change requires a broad strategy aimed at inclusive 
development in the social, political and economic realms. One interviewee stated that: 
You will never reach real gender equality unless you have a society which 
believes in equality on all levels and among all different groups – religious 
equality, gender equality, income equality, these kind of things. I don’t really 
distinguish gender equality alone. It will never be realized in a society which is 
filled with all kinds of inequalities. 
 
As such, her approach is focused on radical broad-based change predicated on the mass 
involvement of the citizenry in demanding reform in all sectors.  
Finally there are those who took the practical approach of adapting strategies to 
the particular situation at hand. One woman noted that the means to achieve change will 
depend on the particular issue in question, the context within which the reformer is 
working as well as the target group. For this reason, she notes that there is no one strategy 
that applies to every situation and reformers must remain attuned to the particular 
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circumstances attached to each issue, as well as to their audiences, and tailor their 
strategies accordingly. 
 
The role of law in movements for social change 
Opinions about the centrality of law to social change varied among the study participants. 
One located law as the central element of any effective social movement, particularly in a 
national context such as that of Egypt, with its large population and prevalence of poverty 
and illiteracy. She noted that awareness-raising campaigns reach only the well-educated, 
whereas the power of law is felt by all citizens. Furthermore, if an individual finds that 
the laws are not being properly implemented, she has access to the courts as a means to 
pressure implementers to fulfill their duties according to the law. Another interviewee 
highlighted the impact of law on behavior, noting that societies can develop a culture of 
adherence to law, which shapes broader patterns of rule-abiding behavior as well as 
content-specific behavior, as laws governing particular arenas are adapted. One woman 
expressed hope for a shift in the role of law in post-uprising Egypt, saying that, “[i]n the 
past, before the revolution the law pushed the changing of the culture. But I hope after the 
revolution it will be the other way.” She did note, however, that the challenges presented 
by traditional culture and Islamic fundamentalism may necessitate that in the realms of 
women’s and human rights law remain as the primary instigator of change for a while 
yet.  
The current political situation looms large in the minds of Egyptian social reform 
advocates, who see great potential for the reshaping of Egyptian society along more 
egalitarian lines. One interviewee sees the need for ensuring the protection of women’s 
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rights in the new constitution, noting that such a guarantee would facilitate the reform of 
other laws along anti-discriminatory lines. This would require the inclusion of women in 
the constitution-drafting process, a demand that has been heard with frequency in the past 
year, but which seems to be falling largely on deaf ears.  
While they concede that law must play a role, most of the women interviewed, 
adhering largely to Scheingold’s “politics of rights” approach, saw it as merely a starting 
point. A typical attitude is expressed by one participant who noted that “we don’t want to 
depend on the law only. We need also to raise awareness and to change the attitudes and 
the culture, besides changing the law. The law pushes hard, but it’s not enough.” There is 
a common understanding that though Egypt has seen progress in the form of increasingly 
gender-equal legislation, women here are still largely oppressed. One woman made the 
point that “[women] are even oppressing themselves . . . by being unaware of these 
things.” Thus while legislative reform may go far in institutionalizing equality, in order to 
achieve substantive equality there is also a great deal of policy and cultural change that 
needs to be addressed.
325
 Cultural shifts are required among the general populace as well 
as implementing institutions in order for shifts in law to come to practical fruition, as a 
law “can be forgotten or be disregarded and denied, because it does not come across how 
we live or how we accept that we want things to happen.”  
Just one interviewee expressed frustration with what she sees as an “obsess[ion] 
with the idea that law can change women’s lives.” To her mind, law is not central, but is 
                                                        
325 This includes addressing the interweaving of different forms of oppression. One interviewee observed 
the impact of poverty on the nationality question in the case of poor women who are married off by their 
families to men from Gulf countries. Such women often end up abandoned with children for whom they 
are unable to procure citizenship, since they often have no documentation to prove either their marriages or 
the parentage of their children.  
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only one among many tools for change, to be employed or not as the situation calls for it. 
Another noted that while it will be important to ground future gender reform efforts in a 
constitution guaranteeing gender equality, as things stand in post-uprising Egypt law is in 
fact of little use. According to her, “the tool for change right now is the people in the 
streets,” and efforts for change should be focused on meeting with local popular 
committees to understand their demands and push for them to be included in the agenda. 
Seen from a gender reform perspective, women’s rights activists should focus on 
incorporating feminist demands into the broader revolution agenda and the reshaping of 
Egyptian social and political culture.  
 
Why nationality law? 
I was interested to know why activists focused on reforming the nationality law and how 
they saw this particular campaign contributing to broader efforts to affect gender equality 
in Egypt. One stated simply that “our goal is that women in Egypt have all [their] rights 
from all the fields. The full citizenship.” Another noted that in fact they didn’t choose the 
nationality law specifically, but it was one among many problems that they felt needed 
addressing; while some devoted their energies to tackling this particular issue, others 
focused their efforts in other areas. The fight to amend the nationality law was seen as 
part of a larger struggle against gender discrimination throughout the Egyptian legal 
system. One activist (a doctor by training) noted that when analyzing the various 
activities of gender reformers in Egypt at the time it turned out that most were working 
on issues related to the control of women’s sexuality (reproductive rights, domestic 
violence, nationality law). She notes that while the focus on the various discriminatory 
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elements of Egyptian law were not necessarily planned to coincide, they were all  “very 
much entangled, and pushing on here and there and the different points of intersection 
actually helped to shake [the discriminatory elements of the legal system].”  
The nationality law provided perhaps an easy target for women’s rights activists, 
insofar as it was an overt and easily discernible example of blatant inequality, written in 
clear terms into the law. Simply put by one of the interviewees, “you can’t have a law 
that so rudely discriminates this way.” Another noted that by focusing on the nationality 
law reformers were able to tackle inequality head on, for “if I am a citizen I have to have 
the same rights men have,” including the right to confer nationality. Furthermore, it 
presented an easier challenge to overcome than family law, which touches more on daily 
interactions within the family, has the potential to negatively impact men as it removes 
their right to exercise control over their wives, and is heavily entwined with elements of 
shari’a. The nationality law had fewer of these barriers to contend with, and thus 
presented itself as an easier sell. This follows a common logic, which, as noted in our 
earlier discussion of the limitations of law as a tool for change, some theorists regard as a 
pitfall of legal-centric approaches to social reform. Scheingold, for example, sees the 
targeting of the most obvious forms of legal discrimination as distracting from more 
useful, but longer-term, battles against underlying social attitudes. By spending their 
capital on reforming what is clearly a discriminatory law, the activists perhaps missed out 
on the opportunity to affect broader change had they adopted something other than a legal 
approach. 
While it may certainly be argued that the reformers misspent limited resources on 
superficial legal reform, there are of course other ways of looking at their decision to 
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target the nationality law. Some reasoned that if they could succeed in gaining reform in 
this regard, it would open the door to further reform, for “[i]f something gets solved it 
paves the way to the other laws.” One reformer regarded nationality law as a good topic 
for women’s rights advocates at that particular historical moment, as they were 
concurrently working to pressure the government to remove its reservations to CEDAW, 
one of which included the right of women to pass their nationality to their children. She 
reasoned that if they could succeed at getting the law amended it would be a “real crack 
in the wall of reservations,” which might contribute to changing broader perceptions 
based on a public shift in the government’s position. 
In the end, the study participants saw a need to address the nationality law 
because:  
When there [is] a gap in any field it means that there are no equal rights for 
women in Egypt. So we have to bridge all these gaps in the law… when we got 
some change on the legal level, it helps to bridge these gaps. Especially with the 
tradition and the culture of the people here. The people in Egypt think that 
woman has not all the rights that man has. So we have to change this traditional 
culture through the law, through education, through the media. 
 
 
What tactics did they employ?  
It is clear from the above conversation that while Egyptian women’s rights activists do 
view law as an important element of gender reform, it is not the only tool they have at 
their disposal. The tactics used to achieve reform - whether to the nationality law or 
within the broader arena of the patriarchal structure of gender relations and institutions - 
are many and varied. I will highlight below some of the tactics employed by activists 
leading up to the 2004 reform. 
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Being Prepared 
As discussed previously, activists involved in nationality law reform in the MENA region 
as a whole embarked on extensive research projects in order to prepare their arguments. 
Their Egyptian counterparts were no exception. One interviewee in particular stressed the 
importance of preparation, noting that “there comes a point where you feel prepared, 
when you’ve done your homework, that then you can also broadcast it.” Solid preparation 
to her means crafting responses ahead of time for any possible challenge that might come 
your way, “[b]ecause you get attacked. Of course, because you’re coming with new 
thinking. And anything that is taking away some authority from patriarchy is definitely 
going to be attacked. So unless you really are solid, and have solid arguments, and you’ve 
done your homework” you’re in trouble. This is particularly the case with religious 
arguments. But once you have satisfied yourself that you are prepared with 
counterarguments, it is time to take your case to the public.  
 
Raising Awareness 
It is at this point that we move into the realm of awareness-raising. The goal of 
awareness-raising tactics is to “enlarge the audience and make the problem appear to be 
affecting the society [at large].” One interviewee broke this down into two component 
parts. The first group that needed to see the issue of women and nationality as a problem 
were women themselves. By raising the awareness of the affected population, she notes, 
you encourage them to “start to demand that they are [] not second class citizens. Because 
they were made to believe as well that that’s not available, and then people really don’t 
know what their rights are, or how far they could go. So you raise their awareness so that 
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they also start to pick up [the call].” Secondly, by publicizing the fact that Egypt was not 
living up to its responsibilities as a signatory to the CEDAW Convention, and by playing 
to public sensitivities about the loss of Egypt’s role as the undisputed regional leader (in 
noting that Tunisia had already solved this particular problem by granting women the 
right to confer nationality) activists were able to shame the government into acting. 
Another activist highlighted the importance of targeting men as well, beginning with 
members of NGOs before moving on to enlist the help of male legal experts, and ending 
in Parliament. The theory behind such lobbying was that by turning nationality into a 
human rights and development issue, activists could convince the men in Parliament that 
the law as it stood negatively affected not only women but children and society as a 
whole. It is interesting, however, to note that none of the women interviewed spoke of the 
need to educate the average male population. Rather, their focus was entirely on 
strategically-placed men who held some sort of position of influence in the realm of law 
and policy. And while their efforts paid off in the end in terms of passage of Law 
154/2004, it is difficult not to see this as a shortcoming of the reform efforts when taking 
into consideration broader goals relating to the shifting of societal attitudes and behavior. 
 The campaigners employed a variety of media formats to convey their message to 
both decision makers and the public at large – from reports and conferences aimed at the 
former to print, radio and television spots targeting the latter. Film was also highlighted 
as a useful awareness-raising tool by a number of participants. The New Woman 
Foundation went so far as to commission a documentary for screening at conferences and 
awareness-raising events. Entitled The Nationality is My and My Family’s Right, it 
presented arguments of leading women’s rights activists and legal experts, as well as 
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testimonials of a range of women of different backgrounds and a famous film director 
who was himself denied Egyptian nationality as a result of being born to an Egyptian 
woman and a non-Egyptian man. The film format is able to speak more directly to the 
audience, requires less of a time commitment, and is accessible to the illiterate, thus 
rendering it a more useful tool for widespread awareness-raising than the written word.  
However, the single most cited awareness-raising tool by those interviewed were 
the testimonials given by women whose families had suffered as a result of 
discriminatory nationality legislation. These ‘tribunals’ included women of a variety of 
backgrounds - urban and rural, wealthy and poor, educated and not - and highlighted the 
practical repercussions of a law that the majority of the population (ordinary citizens and 
legislators alike) had not thought twice about. By opening up a space for women to speak 
about their struggles, activists were able to empower the affected population and 
demonstrate that what people typically think of as “feminist” issues are not the concern 
only of intellectuals. Moreover, by putting a human face to an abstract problem they were 
able to educate politicians who would otherwise have remained ignorant of the practical 
consequences of this particular law. In the words of one study participant: “[a]nd so you 
merge two different worlds. It’s an eye-opener for the two sides. For the very small 
community members up to the policy makers who did not even know that [it’s] such a big 
problem.” While the use of personal testimonials seems to have had a visceral effect on 
those who heard them, I would argue that the reformers perhaps didn’t do enough to fully 
involve these particular women in the reform process. By reducing them in effect to 
symbols of the campaign, the reformers missed out on an opportunity to more deeply 
engage with the people on whose behalf they were advocating. Had they focused more on 
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drawing these women and their various communities into conversations about the 
underlying causes of the problems they faced, they would have opened the door wider to 
the sorts of attitude and behavior change that are the ultimate goal of gender equality 
activists the world over. 
 
Networking (locally, regionally & globally) 
All of the study participants spoke of the central importance of international conferences 
to the nationality law effort. The campaign took many years to reach its goal, and the 
momentum required to keep it going was maintained in part thanks to the participation of 
many of the advocates in such conferences. The participants and/or the organizations they 
work for took part in the NGO forums and shadow reporting procedures linked to the 
International Conference for Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) and the Third 
World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995). While many individuals and NGOs had 
been working on the nationality law issue prior to 1994, one woman notes that:  
The ICPD was really a milestone for us. It gave us an impetus. That was the first 
time that a door opened that was new to us, which was the international arena . . . 
it put us in the limelight. And there was also a certain type of awareness that 
happened among the women’s NGOs. Like never before, and never after . . . all 
the feminist groups were uniting, and there was no rivalry . . . we were eager for 
Egypt’s chance to offer the best papers, the best preparation, because it was 
international . . . we were all doing this in the name of Egypt. 
 
Through presenting at ICPD activists brought the nationality law issue front and 
center, allowing them to “make it a public issue” on the national, regional and 
international levels. By raising it in an international arena they were able to bring the full 
brunt of international pressure to bear on the Egyptian government, and the media 
coverage by local press of an international conference held in Cairo presented a golden 
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opportunity for raising awareness at home. Additionally, the airing of this issue allowed 
them to join forces with organizations in other countries facing similar problems. As one 
interviewee noted, success in one country can be replicated in others in the region, thus 
one of the reformer strategies came to be collective campaigns for change in 
collaboration with feminist movements throughout the Arab world. 
One participant observed that while the intense momentum of the preparatory 
stage for ICPD diminished once the conference was over, by that point the nationality 
law issue had gained enough exposure that others picked up the call, a fresh crop of 
donors stepped in with funding, and the audience continued to grow. Furthermore, ICPD 
was followed up immediately the next year by the Beijing conference, which required 
further preparation and presentation of country reports, and where one activist claimed 
the nationality issue became “crystallized.” Another noted that the Egyptian government:  
Tried to push us back home after ICPD was finished. The National Committee 
for Population and Development they tried to dissolve . . . They weren’t lucky 
because Beijing was coming the next year. And we continued, the same 
committees that were formed for ICPD worked on Beijing. And they began to 
feel really the dangerous thing of having NGOs working together . . . so that was 
a real turning point for NGOs.  
 
Clearly the opportunity to network with other organizations in the region fighting 
similar battles and the garnering of support from international agencies were enormous 
benefits of participation in international conferences. But the cooperation such 
opportunities fostered between Egyptian women’s rights NGOs was an equally, if not 
more, important benefit. One woman who had been active in social and political reform 
movements since the early 1970s noted that at one point early in her experience there had 
been an “escalation of women’s activism to the point of where we were about to have a 
women’s movement . . . we were a group of different groups; we came together to 
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organize and have an association. [But it didn’t work], so we were dispersed in different 
civil society organizations.” Another recalls that as early as the late 1980s a couple of 
women’s rights groups were researching the right to nationality, but because of what she 
called a “gentlewoman’s agreement” between civil society organizations at the time, if 
one group was working on a particular topic, others would direct their energies 
elsewhere. She attributes the shifting of this trend as far as nationality law is concerned to 
the formation of the CEDAW Coalition in 1998, which was tasked with drafting an NGO 
shadow report analyzing the Egyptian government’s progress in implementing the 
CEDAW convention. A portion of the report was devoted to outlining gender 
discrimination in Egyptian law, including the nationality law. And the collaboration of 
individuals and organizations required to do the research and draft the report again drew 
them together in the pursuit of a single goal. All of the abovementioned efforts proved 
useful in that they united different groups, and in one activist’s words, “we began to see 
each other and see potential for our cooperation.” One of the most useful lessons drawn 
from the success of the nationality law campaign is that it demonstrated to the various 
(and at times oppositional) women’s rights organizations that “hypothetically we can 
work [together], hypothetically we can do something and have it be done and 
accomplished.” 
 
Drawing in support from different sectors 
The importance of networking and the development of broad-based support in social 
reform efforts extends beyond just the NGO world. One interviewee attributed the 
success of the nationality law campaign in part to the fact that activists were able to draw 
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in contributors from a variety of sectors to bring their expertise to bear, and to address the 
issue from a variety of angles. She highlighted the importance of knowing your allies, 
and of having different allies for every aspect of a campaign, be it legal, economic, 
social, political or religious. Additionally, to involve a broad base of individuals from 
different sectors can render your argument more convincing. As one of the two 
interviewees who was married to a foreigner, she noted that this was particularly the case 
for her as a leader in the campaign because by enlisting the assistance of experts in a 
variety of fields she was able to discount potential accusations that she was turning her 
own problems into a campaign to amend the law. By broadening the base of supporters 
they were able to frame the nationality law amendment as a common cause with positive 
repercussions for more than just a select few.  
One sectoral approach addressed the content of the law directly through lobbying 
efforts aimed at raising awareness of the problems faced by women and their children 
among decision makers in the Ministries of Interior, Education and Health, whose sectors 
were the most affected. Some devoted themselves to identifying elements within the 
government that were seen to be supporters of women’s rights, and lobbying them 
specifically. Activists held roundtables with members of Parliament as a means to gain 
insider support, and in 2001 a conference on nationality law and the legal and 
constitutional rights of Egyptian women was held to court the favor of high-ranking 
government officials. The endorsement of Suzanne Mubarak was a key element in 
attracting the participation of top-level decision makers. Part of the lobbying effort 
involved presenting lawmakers with a proposed amendment to the law. For this, NGOs 
 118 
enlisted highly respected lawyers to draft the language of a new nationality law.
326
 One 
activist, speaking of the legal experts who were drafted into the reform campaign, again 
noted the importance of drawing on the expertise of those from a variety of fields when 
she said:  
This is why it’s very important to have real lawyers, because we cannot talk 
about this, we can only listen to them and get to know more. But at the end it’s 
their business, so they were the ones who really had the legal paper on this, on 
the whole dimension of how the history was, how to change it, and how they 
would also go about to implement this change.  
 
Another of the legal tactics used was recourse to the courts. The Egyptian Center 
for Women’s Rights focused attention on providing legal aid to women fighting in court 
to get the Egyptian nationality for their children. Their main target was to reach the High 
Constitutional Court, in the hopes that the nationality law would be deemed 
unconstitutional, thus forcing the government’s hand. While no nationality-based claim 
reached that level, there were other gender discrimination-based cases that either did, or 
else made such a stir in the media that they could not be ignored.
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 Various NGOs 
continued bringing cases to court even after the passage of the new law on behalf of 
women married to Palestinians, whose children continued to be denied nationality until 
2011. 
Again we must note that throughout the interviews there was very little mention 
of religion as a framework for reform. The reformer dialogue is framed largely in the 
language of human and citizens’ rights and the role of law, economics and culture in the 
                                                        
326 Though it must be noted that Dr. Fouad Riad had drafted a law granting women the right to pass 
nationality to their children as early as the 1970s. 
327 Including the case of Hend El Hendawy, a young woman who had a child as a result of an illegitimate 
relationship with a young Egyptian actor. He confirmed the relationship, but denied paternity. According to 
one of the study participants, her family’s public support of her and the way in which those demonizing her 
in public framed their arguments provoked many people to support her. 
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oppression of women. Religion was mentioned largely in passing as one among many 
arguments against reform for which counterarguments must be prepared. It is clear that 
the activists perceive of conservative Islam and legislation grounded in shari’a as 
obstacles to women’s equality, and it was taken for granted that religious-based 
arguments would be put forward to try to halt their progress. But the one interviewee who 
spoke at any length about the role of religion in the nationality law campaign ventured 
only to say, “[w]e had to look into religion as a matter of debate, and see is this 
something that could help us? Is this something that they could use against us?” Yet it 
seemed to be only a defensive tactic, and not a framework for reform. She seemed 
satisfied that the reformers were able to formulate arguments proving that a woman’s 
right to pass nationality to her children was in no way prohibited by Islam, and that was 
the end of it. I would venture to say that while in the end they succeeded in satisfying the 
religiously based objections enough to secure passage of the amendment, if the ultimate 
goal of Egyptian women’s rights activists is to achieve attitudinal and behavioral change 
among the population at large, religion will have to play a more significant role in their 
future reform efforts, particularly as Islamists gain a greater foothold in the Egyptian 
political landscape. 
 
Did they succeed? 
When asked if they felt they could point to the nationality law reform campaign as a 
success the majority of those interviewed answered yes. They succeeded in galvanizing 
enough support to force the government to amend a law that was clearly discriminatory 
against women. In doing so they helped, if only slightly, to redefine what it means to be a 
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citizen and to bear a citizen’s rights in Egypt. One woman went so far as to say that she 
feels that only seven years later the general public is taking the law as it currently stands 
for granted. The ability of women to pass their nationality to their children has become so 
second nature that the vast majority don’t realize that this right they take for granted took 
well over a decade and a concerted and coordinated effort to achieve.  
What many seem to have taken away from their experience of the campaign is a sense 
of satisfaction and empowerment in that they succeeded in creating change. As one 
woman noted: “[i]t was just also some sort of feeling that ‘we did it.’ I mean we did 
change the law. You did succeed. The movement can succeed.” And most spoke of the 
ten years preceding the law’s amendment as a sort of heyday of collaboration between 
Egyptian women’s rights NGOs, and point to the passage of the law as both a personal 
and a collective achievement. They point to the automatic conferral of nationality from 
woman to child and the release of pressure on such women in terms of the fees they no 
longer have to pay as the tangible benefits of their years of effort. Most focused on these 
practical gains when speaking of success. Only one spoke of the increased sense of 
belonging for the children of Egyptian women and foreign men as a positive outcome of 
the reform, as well as the release of women from the guilt many held in relation to the 
effects of their choice to marry a foreigner. Yet despite most being clear in their 
perception of the nationality law reform as part of a broader gender equality agenda, only 
one made reference to the broader effects of the amendment, noting that:  
I think it has affected the culture of the people. Because when you see the revolution 
after 25 January you can see a lot of women inside Tahrir Square. And this cannot 
happen before. I think this is a sign of the gender change in the culture of the people. 
When we saw women stayed in the square beside men in the night . . . no one pushed 
her outside the square. It’s a big indicator to the change. I think when we got the 
change in the law and when we pushed for the shadow report and when we go to 
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workshops everywhere, all this raises awareness, and changes the stereotype of 
women inside the mind of the man and also the woman.  
 
Despite the overwhelming sense of having achieved their goal, it is clear that these 
activists do not perceive of their success as being unqualified. One participant stated 
unequivocally, “[w]e did not solve it a hundred percent.” The exclusion of the children of 
Egyptian women and Palestinian men loomed large in their minds, as did the fact that 
Egyptian women are still barred from passing their nationality to their foreign husbands 
in a way that does not hold true for Egyptian men married to foreign women. Clearly 
there were compromises made, and there remains much work to be done. Some took this 
as something of a defeat, as the woman who stated that, “I still believe the nationality law 
is anti-constitutional.” The inability of women married to Palestinian men to confer their 
nationality on their children is still a form of discrimination against women, because in 
the end “there is no difference between an Egyptian woman marrying a Palestinian and 
one marrying a British [man].” If it is about the ability of all Egyptian women, regardless 
of their choice of spouse, to exercise a right on equal terms with Egyptian men, then the 
law failed to eliminate the discrimination it set out to combat. Yet most of the women, 
though recognizing the amendment as flawed and incomplete (whether in text or in 
application), view their efforts as successful, and simply note the need to continue to fight 
for full and unqualified equality. Some have focused their efforts on ensuring that the 
nationality law amendment is properly applied to all those affected, and thus continue to 
push for the inclusion of the children of Palestinian men. Others have moved on to 
fighting for women’s ability to pass their nationality to their husbands. One noted that 
attention has shifted to other areas out of necessity. She says that one must: 
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Take a break, let them swallow it. And then don’t wait for long, but move on 
afterwards. But then the way it happened in Egypt, there were other problems, so 
we . . . didn’t move this on for the husbands . . . Of course it’s a discrepancy, but 
we have other problems, other fronts to fight, so it’s not one of the priorities . . . 
it definitely needs some more work, just not now. First we solve the others that 
are really most affecting women. 
 
Problems of implementation  
Despite indications in the literature that the amended law has faced difficulties in the 
implementation stage, the majority of the activists interviewed saw little problem with its 
application. Some noted that while acquisition of nationality was not automatic for those 
born before the amendment, most who have applied for nationality have gotten it (barring 
of course the children of Palestinian men). One observed that those who face difficulties 
still have recourse to the courts, and that the precedent built by the number of cases being 
tried in court will invariably make nationality easier to acquire with time. When asked, 
most had not heard of the stipulation noted in some of the literature that those born before 
the amendment had a year within which to lodge their applications, or they would lose 
the right to acquire nationality permanently. While everyone expressed concern regarding 
the exclusion of Palestinians, only one interviewee noted that there may be difficulties of 
application broader than that. In her opinion the discretionary power granted to the 
Minister of Interior to approve or deny applications for nationality meant that “the law 
had its hands cut.” She makes note of broader issues when she says:  
All laws, if you don’t make it easy to implement them, some people will benefit 
and some people will not benefit. Because if you have to do too much effort, 
maybe you can’t. So that’s why I say when they say we changed the laws for 
women – yes, changing the law is very important. But it’s not enough.  
 
She sees problems of implementation related to most of Egypt’s progressive laws in the 
realm of gender equality, from the khul to the nationality law, and particularly as relates 
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to the barriers to poor women benefitting. Another interviewee raised the issue of the 
association of gender equality laws with Suzanne Mubarak and the Mubarak regime. 
Laws “hijacked” by the former regime have lost credibility since the fall of Hosni 
Mubarak, with the result that they are more difficult to implement. 
As noted by Freedom House, “The challenge in the years to come will be to adopt 
the institutional and policy framework necessary to make the amended child law and 
other such reforms enforceable. Proper implementation will also require sensitive and 
consistent awareness-raising and activism at the community level, as only social changes 
can make beneficial laws a reality in people's lives.”328 
 
Recognizing women as full and active members of society 
If the goal of a gender equality movement is the recognition of women as full and active 
members of society, how does the nationality law campaign contribute? If viewed 
through a purely statistical lens, the reform must be considered at least a partial success. 
Since July 2004, countless children of Egyptian women and foreign men have been 
granted Egyptian nationality. And for such children born since then there will never be a 
question regarding their citizenship status. These benefits cannot be denied. It must also 
be acknowledged that the passage of the reform was at the very least a symbolic victory 
for women’s rights activists. By recognizing women as sources of Egyptian citizenship 
on an equal footing with men (at least as far as their children are concerned) Law 
154/2004 takes a step toward positioning women as full and equal members of the 
national political community.  
                                                        
328 Freedom House, supra note 173. 
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Golia is of the opinion that the benefits stop there, for though “The new law wins 
points for symbolic value by extending the blood right to women, [] it does little to let 
them define the society in which they belong.”329 And it also cannot be denied that social 
perceptions persist that the children of Egyptian women and foreign men are not real 
Egyptians. In a 2011 study of perceptions of identity among half-Egyptians, Sandra 
Fernandez noted that even seven years after the passage of Law 154/2004:  
The claim that having an Egyptian father is what makes one Egyptian is widely 
made by Egyptians. [One woman interviewed] cites it as the reason why her 
Egyptian friends tell her she will never be Egyptian regardless of citizenship, 
knowledge of social nuances, and exceptional language ability. Nationality for 
her was meant to end all the questions; she had Egyptian nationality and that 
made her Egyptian. Every day for her is yet another obstacle course in which she 
needs to prove to Egyptians that she is not foreign.330  
 
Perhaps it is simply a question of time – seven years is a drop in the bucket of the 
hundreds (if not thousands) of years of Arab tradition wherein belonging in the kin, 
religious and political community derived exclusively from the father’s line. 
Pronouncement of the law clearly does not automatically affect social perceptions. One 
can hope, however, that nationality granted through the mother’s line will come to be 
assumed, as the practice of acquisition at birth becomes a foregone conclusion. Then, 
perhaps, we might see a slow shift in perceptions. But as noted in the reaction of those 
men who heckled the International Women’s Day demonstrators with chants of “you are 
not Egyptian!” this shift is a long way off.  
Looking at the reform through the lens of women’s active citizenship 
participation, we come away with yet another picture. It is largely women’s activism that 
brought the amendment to fruition. For more than a decade women’s rights agencies 
                                                        
329 Golia, supra note 176. 
330 Fernandez, supra note 202, at 87. 
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researched, lobbied, raised awareness, and gathered support in an organized and 
collaborative effort to affect change. The fact that they succeeded in securing an 
amendment to a discriminatory law has had a profound effect, not only on the legal 
landscape of Egypt, but also on the women’s rights community and the individual women 
involved in the campaign. Many of the women interviewed spoke of the personal 
satisfaction and sense of empowerment they got from having succeeded in changing a 
law based in centuries-old patriarchal modes of thinking. One woman said, “it taught us if 
you really fight for something, you can get what you want,” while another noted that their 
experience taught them that advocacy efforts can actually succeed. In the context of a 
political and social system that discourages women from actively engaging with the 
public sphere, this is no mean feat. As an exercise in political engagement, the nationality 
law campaign must be viewed as a success, for as one woman noted: “It brought us also 
more acquainted with the public arena, how it functions, what the role of NGOs is . . . 
what the others are doing, what their mandates [are], what the international agreements 
are. So it was more of a practical experience, and also a morale booster.” She went on to 
note that her experience with the nationality law campaign encouraged her to continue to 
push for change in other realms. 
 
Moving Forward 
While the nationality law campaign does demonstrate the power and possibility of 
women’s citizenship participation in Egypt, where it falls short is in its failure to enlist 
the participation of a broad base of Egyptian society. Certainly awareness-raising was 
one of the reformers’ strategies, and played a role in the campaign’s ultimate success. Yet 
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it is difficult not to view the campaign as being focused within a small elite sector of 
Egyptian society. Both the activists themselves and the targets of their efforts belonged 
largely to an elite and educated class. To truly transform the social assumptions, attitudes 
and behaviors underlying discriminatory legislation and practice, reformers will have to 
focus their efforts more on engaging with a broader base of the Egyptian public, 
including not only politicians and other elites, but also field level decision-makers and 
average Egyptians. One activist observed when asked what she would have done 
differently: 
I think we need to find some ways to get the people on the street contacted in our 
advocacy. Not only the NGOs. We need some strategies to make it on the 
popular level . . . Because our advocacy for the nationality law [] need[ed] about 
20 years . . . And if we need 20 years to change everything it will be a big 
problem. So we need to be faster, and we need masses, a movement of masses 
beside these demands. And this is part of women’s issues here in Egypt. Still 
women’s rights is not a public issue. Till now it’s a women’s issue. And we need 
to transfer it to be a public issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having spent some time now exploring the intersections of law, citizenship, gender-based 
discrimination and social reform movements, we find that the women interviewed for this 
study embody many of the complexities of the gender equality struggle, at both the 
international and the regional level. As educated members of the middle class, they have 
a certain level of access to decision makers and thus are positioned to affect change. 
Being conversant in the language and ideologies of international human and women’s 
rights, they chose to frame their reform arguments in terms of women’s rights as 
individuals, which alienated them somewhat from a cultural context where rights have 
traditionally been framed in terms of the family, and where the institutional and cultural 
support for the claiming of individual rights is lacking. They exhibit a largely secularist 
frame of mind, which further isolates them from a system based in no small part on 
reference to religious law and a population heavily influenced by religion. While they 
certainly recognized the need to raise public awareness on a large scale, and while some 
spoke of the need to mobilize the masses, they fell short of this more expansive goal. All 
of these elements present challenges to substantive and sustained gender reform within 
the Egyptian context. 
It is clear that the reformers interviewed for this study have a sophisticated and 
varied understanding of social change and the means to achieve it. While some place 
great faith in the law as the ultimate guarantor of women’s rights and others view 
substantive social change as coming mainly through broad and sustained dialogue with 
average citizens, most recognized the complex and dynamic interplay of law, awareness-
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raising, economic equality and women’s active participation in society and politics as 
necessary for true and lasting change.  
Evaluating the success of their efforts is not a simple task, and one can only come 
away from such an exercise with the impression that their success was mixed. On the one 
hand they achieved exactly the goal they had set out to achieve – they persuaded the 
Egyptian state to acknowledge women as bearers of nationality. In a context where 
women have traditionally been viewed as less than full members of the political 
community, and as less than men in nearly every way, this is no small feat. But as we 
have seen, when reformers place excessive emphasis on the power of law to affect social 
change they miss out on the opportunity to address broader, more systemic issues of 
inequality and injustice. By pinning their hopes on the power of law to bring change, they 
fail to directly address the attitude and behavior shift necessary for true, substantive, 
lasting change. 
At the same time, it could be argued that the nationality law campaign 
exemplified exactly the indirect benefits so lauded by mobilization theorists. In the 
process of fighting to amend the nationality law, the reformers exercised active, 
participatory citizenship in mobilizing themselves, raising public awareness, and in effect 
forcing their government to make good on its domestic and international promises. In so 
doing they created strong links - between issues, between sectors of society, between 
civil society organizations working toward similar goals, between women from different 
backgrounds, between local, regional and international efforts and organizations – that 
may serve to promote further reform if properly nurtured. They were rightfully proud of 
the collaboration between women’s rights NGOs, which reached unprecedented levels 
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during the campaign, and if harnessed, could result in further significant reforms. And 
finally, their achievement resonated on both a personal and collective level, as they 
realized their power as citizens to affect change within the national community.  
The nationality law campaign is less successful when one considers the barriers to 
implementation, which highlight ingrained social attitudes that require more than legal 
reform to shift. The discretionary power granted to the Ministry of Interior and field-level 
implementing authorities suggests that the right to confer nationality on their children is 
not one that will be granted to Egyptian women across the board. And as one interviewee 
pointed out, aren’t Egyptian women simply Egyptian women - with all the rights 
resulting from their status as citizens - regardless of whom they choose to marry? If this 
were truly conceived of as a right of all citizens, there would be no question of 
discretionary application of the law.  
The fact that the reformers’ efforts stopped largely at the passage of the law 
suggests that while they did in the abstract conceive of it as part and parcel of a broader 
struggle for gender equality, they still viewed the reform of the law as something of an 
end in itself. I would argue that if they failed anywhere, it was here – in prioritizing the 
writing of legislation over the mobilization process preceding it and the sustained 
capitalization on that mobilization long after the amendment of the law. For their efforts 
to bring about the broader goal they desire – the shifting of gender relations in Egypt to 
reflect full equality between men and women as equal members of society – there are a 
number of things they could have done differently. While they did focus on recruiting 
women to the cause from a broad spectrum of Egyptian society, this was largely in the 
service of providing the personal testimonials that demonstrated the law’s widespread 
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impact and served as a means to influence policy makers. Their efforts at awareness-
raising seem to have been directly largely at elite members of Egyptian society, those 
with the power to write law. This reflects a belief that change occurs at the top, and that 
law is the primary determinant of attitudinal and behavioral change. Yet the attitudes of 
the masses - be they field-level decision makers or the men shouting “You are not 
Egyptian!” at women gathered in Tahrir Square - are ultimately going to have the greatest 
affect on women’s daily lives. By focusing their efforts on amending legislation at the 
macro level, and failing to address attitudes and behaviors on the micro level or to engage 
a broad base of Egyptian women in that process, reformers forgo half the battle.  
In the end we are left with the following question: has the passage of Law 
154/2004 better positioned women to take their place as full and active members of 
Egyptian society? Has it better positioned them to participate as citizens? While it would 
be easy to postulate that it has not, the question is not in fact a simple one to answer. 
Achievements such as the nationality law reform are only part of the picture. They create 
expectations, and with time perhaps the notion of women as bearers of nationality will 
become second nature. What remains to be seen is whether that attitude will form part of 
a broader perception of women as full and equal citizens, with the freedom to participate 
as they wish and within a framework which allows them to do so. While the 
promulgation of progressive legislation may not necessarily precipitate the mobilization 
of women to active participation, in this case it was certainly made possible by such 
mobilization. And perhaps these activists’ successes will inspire others to attempt similar 
reforms in other arenas, or to adapt the lessons of the nationality law campaign such that 
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the next campaign is more ambitious yet, and tackles gender discrimination on more than 
just the level of legislative reform.   
Mary Dietz describes active citizenship as a means, not an end, as a continuous 
engagement with the community rather than an avenue to the securing of rights. The 
active citizen doesn’t stop once the goal has been achieved because not only is the goal 
but one small element of the larger objective, but what lies at the heart of citizenship is 
the engagement in the process of participation itself. The reformers interviewed for this 
study are prime examples of active citizens, fully engaged with the struggle to better their 
society. By fighting to secure the recognition of women’s equal citizenship rights they 
demonstrated their own citizenship power and achieved substantive gains for women in 
the process. The next step is to engage the very women on whose behalf they have been 
fighting to take up their own versions of active citizenship. 
 
